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Governance in Transition.  
What Makes Georgia’s Higher Education System 
so Corrupt? 2
Kristin Höltge 
Zusammenfassung 
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die Ursachen von administrativer Korruption in 
Georgiens Hochschulsystem am Beispiel der prestigeträchtigen Institute für Inter-
nationales Recht, Politikwissenschaften und Westliche Philologie der Staatlichen 
Universität Tbilissi Ivane Jawachischwili (TSU). Der Analyse liegt ein instituti-
onsökonomischen Ansatzes zugrunde. Relevante Forschungsfelder sind die Vor-
bereitungsphase der Studienbewerber und -bewerberinnen, das Studienaufnahme-
verfahren, die Zwischen- und Abschlussprüfungen sowie die Bereitstellung von 
Lehrmaterialien durch Professoren. 
Aus den empirischen Ergebnissen können folgende Schlussfolgerungen gezo-
gen werden: Im Gegensatz zur weitverbreiteten Behauptung, dass Mangel an 
Transparenz und Eindeutigkeit für Korruption verantwortlich wären, zeigt diese 
Studie, dass die Prozeduren auf administrativer Ebene transparent sind. Dennoch 
ist Korruption im Hochschulsystem Georgiens weit verbreitet. Ursächlich dafür 
sind informelle Institutionen, sowohl sowjetischen Ursprungs als auch traditionel-
le georgische Werte und Normen, die formelle Prozesse sowie die Beziehungen 
zwischen principal, agents und clients determinieren. Die starke, horizontale Ver-
flechtung zwischen den agents („Roten Professoren“) und deren Deckung durch 
den principal erlaubt es diesen Professoren, in ihren Funktionen als Mitglieder des 
Auswahlausschusses als „joint monopolists“ (Shleifer und Vishny 1993) zu agie-
ren und so ihr Gesamteinkommen an Bestechungsgeldern zu maximieren. 
Schlussfolgernd kann festgestellt werden, dass die interne Struktur der TSU re-
formiert werden muss, um das „joint monopoly“ des Auswahlausschusses und die 
mächtige Position der Universitätsleitung zu durchbrechen. Dafür müssen sozio-
                                                 
2 Die vorliegende Arbeit wurde 2005 am Osteuropa-Institut der Freien Universität Berlin als Magis-
terarbeit vorgelegt. 
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ökonomisch verträgliche, finanzielle Kompensationszahlungen geleistet und takt-
volle Austrittsoptionen entwickelt werden, um eine würdevolle (Früh-) Pensionie-
rung unqualifizierter Angestellten durchsetzen zu können. Für die Neubesetzung 
der Stellen müssen qualifikationsorientierte Auswahlverfahren und Wettbewerb 
unter dem Lehrpersonal eingeführt werden.  
Diese Ergebnisse sollten beim Design allgemeiner Anti-Korruptionskampagnen in 
post-sowjetischen Verwaltungen berücksichtigt werden. Rechtsreformen sind 
sicherlich notwendige, jedoch unzureichende Maßnahmen, um Korruption einzu-
dämmen. Die internen Strukturen neu zu regeln, scheint vielversprechender. 
Preliminary remarks 
This paper deals with the delicate phenomenon corruption. Despite the fact that in-
depth publications and, in particular, interviews with a wide array of persons 
provided a detailed and complex picture of the issue, it also faces certain 
limitations. The findings are not and cannot be complete but hopefully contribute 
to a better understanding of corruption in Higher Education Sector in Georgia.  
As this paper was be presented as a Magisterarbeit to the Institute of East 
European Studies of the Freie Universität Berlin, quotations in German were not 
translated into English. 
To avoid misunderstandings in the terminology, two notes are given here: 
− The terms public officer, civil servant and government official are used 
synonymously.  
− According to North (1990) the term “institution” is used in the sense of the 
“rules of the game” and therefore, “institutions” that provide education are 
named “education bodies”.  
1 Why Examining Corruption in Georgia’s Higher Education 
System? 
Academics and practitioners agree about the negative consequences of corruption 
in the long term. Therefore, recent research focuses on its causes to develop anti-
corruption strategies. The range and extent of these causes is complex and differs 
among countries and sectors. Thus, in-depth research is required to identify the 
roots of corruption in particular sectors in greater detail. 
 
Georgia’s Higher Education System (GHES) is perceived as one of the most 
corrupt sectors in the country. Careful estimates assume illegal income for 
“preparation” of applicants as high as USD 65 million annually plus USD 50 
million paid as bribes during the entrance procedure (Rostiashvili 2004: 28). This 
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study examines corruption in this sector and focuses on its causes. Therefore, four 
fields, namely the applicants’ tuition phase, their entrance procedure, provision of 
books by professors and midterm and final exams, at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi 
State University (TSU) are investigated in order to conclude why corruption is so 
pervasive. As discussed in more detail in the next sections, this case study has 
been chosen for the relevance of corruption, in general, the importance of the 
country and the sector: First, corruption can have extremely negative impacts, 
especially in the long term. Identifying its causes offers opportunities to curb it 
effectively. Second, Georgia is a relevant case. On one hand, it has become a 
leading actor within the Caucasus region and a target for international donors and 
foreign investors, on the other, Georgia is known for its bad governance. Having 
investigated potentials and deficits helps to avoid ineffective investments and to 
direct finances in expedient projects. Third, the Higher Education System itself is 
worth being examined as it is the source for a country’s human capital potential in 
the long term and thus relevant for innovation and progress. The following 
sections explain the three issues mentioned above in more detail. 
1.1 Corruption and its consequences 
For decades, the extent of corruption as well as its consequences for 
democratization and economic development were underestimated, and therefore 
played down and condoned by international organizations, politicians and experts. 
The argument was put forward that corruption speeds up administrative 
procedures and thus, pushes economic development (Lui 1985) in favor of foreign 
investors in developing and transition countries. Recent studies, however, 
challenge the so called “grease” argument, referring to corruption’s negative 
impacts in the long term, and its rapid spread.  
So far, research has mainly concentrated on the consequences of corruption. 
The following are some factors that strongly emphasize corruption’s negative 
effects.  
− Using data from worldwide firm-level surveys, Daniel Kaufmann and Shang-
Jin Wei found no evidence for the “efficient grease” hypothesis. They even 
show that “bribes firms have to pay and the effective harassment they face in 
equilibrium can be positively correlated” (Kaufmann/Wei 1999: 15). 
− Paolo Mauro also provides empirical evidence to support the anti-grease view. 
Using the indices of corruption and other institutional variables of more than 
100 countries drawn from Political Risk Services, Inc., he states that 
“corruption is found to lower investment, thereby lowering economic growth” 
(Mauro 1995: 263). Additionally, he points out that corruption correlates 
negatively with government spending on education which indirectly hinders 
growth as well (Mauro 1998). He further emphasizes three aspects concerning 
the expenditure side of the state budget: According to Mauro (2002) corruption 
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may lead to loss of tax revenue and thereby affect the level of public 
expenditure. Also the quality of public spending may be negatively affected 
since public procurement contracts may be allocated to low quality firms. 
Regarding the composition of government expenditure it can be stated that 
“government officials may be more likely to choose to undertake types of 
government expenditure that allow them to collect bribes and to maintain them 
secret.” (Mauro 2002: 343) Taking into consideration foreign aid, he argues 
that corruption might reduce the effectiveness of aid flow by financing 
unproductive public expenditure.  
− Susan Rose-Ackerman compares the effects of a single corrupt transaction at 
the micro level with corruption in a broader sense (Rose-Ackerman 2002). 
Assuming competitive markets, the “market-clearing” bribe will be equal to the 
market price as the service will be provided to those willing to pay the highest 
bribe, or the highest price, respectively. Thus, under very limited conditions, 
corruption may lead to efficient results. But Rose-Ackerman refers to various 
situations where competitive markets do not exist or are not even anticipated. 
In the cases of subsidized housing or university admissions, for example, 
giving access to those paying the highest bribe undermines the distributive goal 
of the program. The lack of complete information about the bribe’s amount 
does not satisfy the precondition of competitive markets and may reduce the 
number of applicants. At an institutional level, additional transaction costs are 
required to initiate the corrupt transaction.3 Even more so, as the illegal nature 
of corruption requires secrecy, additional resources have to be expended to 
keep the transaction hidden. The efficiency of the state structure may also 
suffer from corruption as officials may create scarcity and delays in services in 
order to maximize their profits. Competition among the officials might lead to 
the further spread of corruption, and the avoidance of reforms within the state 
structure. At an overall level, perceived arbitrary and unfair patterns of civil 
service and the resulting uncertainty may undermine government’s legitimacy 
and, even worse, support organized crime, if corruption is linked to the 
facilitation of illegal business. 
− While Mauro and Rose-Ackerman emphasize the consequences at a macro 
level, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) concentrate on the individual. 
Looking from a micro perspective they argue that, if rent seeking is more 
lucrative than production work, highly qualified individuals would rather look 
for a position with a high potential for rent seeking than for work appropriate to 
                                                 
3  Anne Osborne Krueger already proved in 1974 additional welfare cost of competitive rent 
seeking. 
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his or her education. The loss of talent again reduces the potential for economic 
growth.  
From the arguments discussed above it can be concluded that the long term 
consequences of corruption are negative, and thus, its restriction is essential for 
democratization and economic development. Therefore, in-depth research within 
countries on the causes is required (Kaufmann, Kraay 2002; Kaufmann 1998) in 
order to identify those factors favorable for corruption, and subsequently to 
develop strategies to curb it.  
1.2 Georgia as relevant case 
Corruption is pervasive in Georgia. Empirical data from a World Bank survey 
specify the unofficial GDP as a percentage of the total GDP in 1995 62.6 %, 
which is the highest share among 17 countries of Central Eastern Europe (CEE) 
and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) (Johnson, Kaufmann, Shleifer 1997: 183). 
More recent studies focus on firms’ strategies to deal with public officials. 
Georgia ranks third among 20 CEE and FSU countries concerning the share of 
firms having paid bribes to avoid taxes and regulation (Hellman, Jones, 
Kaufmann, Schankerman 2000: 25). Asking about what percentage of revenues 
firms typically pay annually in unofficial payments to public officials, Georgia 
even leads the list at an amount of about 8 % (Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann, 
Schankerman 2000: 35).  
Despite Georgia’s negative ranking in terms of governance it has attracted the 
attention of various international actors. The World Bank finances huge projects, 
in particular in the Road and Health Sectors as well as in the field of Municipal 
Development. The International Monetary Fund approved a three-year 
arrangement under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility at an amount of 
about USD 144 million to support the government's economic program until 
June, 2007. Based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that 
came into force on July 1, 1999, the EU has established its relationship with 
Georgia. By means of its financial instrument TACIS (Technical Assistance to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States), the EU provides grant assistance to 
support various projects, in particular institutional, legal and administrative 
reforms. Recent measures include the formulation of the EU’s relationship to the 
three South Caucasus countries within its European Neighbourhood Policy. At an 
economic level, various multinational companies have invested into geo-
strategically relevant Georgia. Among them British Petroleum (BP) is the most 
powerful due to its leadership in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project. 
Last but not least, Georgia has attracted the interest of the world media since 
Mikhail Saakashvili declared the “Rose Revolution” and was elected president in 
January 2004. 
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1.3 Georgia’s Higher Education System and Corruption 
Investing in education means investing in the future, as education is a source for a 
country’s human capital and means of innovation. Thus, the quality of any 
education system is a key factor for a country’s political and economic 
performance. It influences a society’s values and attitudes, but also affects the 
potential for future innovation, and thus, for economic growth.  
Theoretical publications suggest a wide range of possible factors responsible 
for a high level of corruption. Among them, a lack of transparency and lucidity 
ranks first concerning administrative corruption (Tanzi 2000: 112 ff.). It is 
assumed that once the authorities’ responsibilities, legislation on citizens’ 
entitlement, as well as prices and procedures to obtain public services are 
transparent, public officials would face more limited opportunity to levy bribes, 
and citizens would be empowered to reject these demand for bribes. 
The higher education system in Georgia, however, is known for its wide-spread 
corruption. The entrance procedure, in particular, and award of diplomas are both 
highly affected by bribery. Nevertheless, there are signs that the sector is relatively 
transparent. This combination of pervasive corruption on the one side and 
apparent transparency on the other provides an interesting case for further 
research in order to verify whether there is a causal relationship between 
corruption and transparency.  
Finally, Georgia’s higher education system was more accessible to me as a 
student than other sectors. When doing empirical research on a topic as delicate as 
corruption, a basic sense of trust and familiarity is required to receive as much 
information as possible. My background as a student allowed me first to better 
compare certain issues and second to provide information on the education sector 
in my own country once my interview partner became interested in the topic. This 
then led to better understanding and trust. 
1.4 Focus of the Analysis  
As outlined above, corruption has negative impacts on economic performance and 
democracy. Thus, research on its causes is essential in order to develop restraining 
strategies. Georgia presents a very relevant case study since corruption has 
pervaded almost all fields of the public sphere and, therefore, is seen as the main 
obstacle to economic prosperity. Corruption is particularly pervasive in the higher 
education system.  
This paper investigates the internal structure of Georgia’s higher education 
system. First, the often discussed claim that a lack of transparency and lucidity is 
responsible for a high level of corruption will be verified. Second, the formal 
relationship among public agents as determinant of administrative corruption is 
examined. Third, informal institutions, of Soviet origin in particular, are included 
in the investigations to conclude whether or not norms, values or habits are 
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responsible for the high degree of corruption in Georgia’s higher education 
system. 
This study is structured as follows: After introducing definitions and categories 
of corruption (Rose-Ackerman 1978, Johnston 1996, Jain 1998, Kaufmann 1998, 
Stykow 2002, Kurer 2003, Sturm 2003) in chapter 2, I will then discuss the causes 
of corruption suggested in theoretical literature in chapter 3. In doing so, I will 
examine three levels. The determining framework, namely wages, personal and 
country characteristics, are investigated in chapter 3.1. Chapter 3.2 deals with 
legislation, formal relationships within the principal-agent-client structure and 
monitoring as formal institutions. Informal institutions such as cultural and historical 
legacies are discussed in chapter 3.3. It should be noted that the core of recent 
publications concentrates on the second level mentioned – formal institutions. Here, 
the issues of monitoring and controlling, transparency and lucidity, penalty 
mechanisms, the discretionary power of public officials and the competition among 
them, as well as the opportunities for publicity all play an important role.  
After discussing these various approaches to explaining corruption, I will apply 
the findings on Georgia’s higher education system in chapter 4. The investigations 
are conducted in the light of Institutional Economics and thus, concentrated on 
actors and the way they shape both institutions and their formal relationships with 
each other. Relevant questions to be addressed include: Who is involved in 
administrative procedures? (actors) How is the Admission Committee set up? 
(formal and informal institutions) Do the members enjoy certain monopoly positions 
over admissions or is there competition among them? (relationship) Do they enjoy 
great discretionary power? Is the entrance procedure transparent? Are rules and 
regulations lucid? Does any monitoring or controlling body exist? Is there any 
penalty system in case of abuse of one’s position? Were there cases of punishment 
resulting from corrupt practice? Is there any publicity on corrupt behavior? 
(formal institutions) Are officials satisfied with their wages? (socio-economic 
conditions).  
To find answers on these questions I examine current publications on the 
Georgian higher education system. Most importantly, the World Bank is 
conducting a project on reforming the education sector. There are some very 
useful publications among the background research papers (Lorentzen 2000). The 
Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC), Georgia Office, also deals 
with corruption in the higher education system and published the results of its 
survey recently (Rostiashvili 2004). The Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association 
(GYLA) has also published two reports, one in cooperation with Georgian Young 
Economists’ Association (GYEA) and Transparency International (TI) (GYEA a. 
o. 2002, GYLA 2003). 
Additionally, I personally conducted stakeholder interviews in two stages. I 
spoke to experts who work on the issues as a third party, as I do. Among this 
group were government officials, members of the Georgian Chamber of Control, 
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academics and representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
experts working for the World Bank’s reform project. I then interviewed teaching 
staff and students of TSU as persons being directly involved in the process. 
Finally, chapter 5 summarizes the findings and draws conclusions. At first, I 
discuss the research results of my case and the perspectives of Georgia’s higher 
education system in terms of corruption. Based on these results, I am trying to 
assess the ongoing reforms and to make recommendations concerning anti-
corruption measures in the higher education system in Georgia. In a second stage, 
I outline some thoughts about applying my findings to a broader context. 
Although generalizing is risky, as sectors and countries demonstrate very specific 
characteristics, my findings hopefully contribute to a better understanding of 
corruption in other post-Soviet states and might be useful for developing anti-
corruption strategies.  
2 Corruption: Definitions and Categories 
“No one has ever devised a universally satisfying ‘one-line’ (Philp 1987:1, cited 
by Johnston) definition of corruption” (Johnston 1996: 321) as “no definition … 
will be equally accepted in every nation” (Gardiner 1993: 33). John Gardiner 
gives three reasons for that: the different legal definition of corruption, unequal 
effects of similar corrupt acts in different countries, and a variation in public 
opinion about corruption (Gardiner 1993: 33 – 35). 
Thus, what authors intend when they apply the term corruption differs among 
disciplines, schools of thought, and in space and time. Roland Sturm examines 
three political science approaches that view corruption in very different ways 
(Sturm 2003). Table 1 presents a summarizing overview. 
The traditional approach4 views corruption as a lack of political culture or as a 
disease of the society which consequently leads to moral wasting. The 
functionalistic approach at the other end of the scale assumes a certain benefit 
from corruption.5 Corruption is one option among many to fulfill society’s needs.  
                                                 
4  Carl J. Friedrich and Paul Noack represent this approach among others.  
5  Neil J. Smelser, for example, claims that corruption assumes system function by stating: 
“corruption can and does have numerous consequences that are anything but evil – providing 
welfare services for disadvantaged citizens that otherwise would be without them; …” (Smelser 
1971: 10). 
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Table 1: Political Science approaches and their assessment of corruption 
Approach Evaluation of  corruption Focus on 
Normative/traditional 
approach 
negative continuous monitoring of 
corruption 
Functionalistic approach rather positive consequences of 
corruption (ex post) 
Rational Choice 
approach 
value-free causes of corruption  
(ex ante) 
 
In this paper the value-free Rational Choice approach is chosen. As argued by 
Susan Rose-Ackerman (Rose-Ackerman 1978), for example, individuals are 
rational actors who make their decisions according to cost-benefit considerations. 
Positive and negative incentives play an important role for individuals’ decisions. 
The Rational Choice approach asks why actors decide to participate in corruption. 
It tries to understand causes rather than looking at the effects of corruption. The 
approach’s findings are of high value for policy decisions and in developing anti-
corruption campaigns, since awareness of the causes allows root causes to be 
addressed and not just the symptoms. Additionally, in contrast to the other 
approaches mentioned above, the Rational Choice approach is able to partially 
forecast future trends rather than just examining the past or present.  
In analyzing the causes of corruption in Georgia’s higher education system the 
Rational Choice approach allows us to examine the relevant actors and their 
interests in a neutral way. It aims to find out why agents and clients cooperate, in 
order to identify the incentives that need to be in place to help curb corrupt 
practices in the universities’ administrations.  
Attempts to define corruption emphasize varying aspects and contexts of this 
phenomenon as outlined below. 
The Brockhaus Enzyklopädie, for example, offers a broad definition: Corrupti-
on is “ein moralisch verwerfliches Handeln und Verhalten, bei dem bestimmte, 
allgemein anerkannte gesellschaftliche Grundsätze nicht mehr wirksam sind und 
das je nach Verbreitung und Duldung das gesellschaftliche Leben bestimmen und 
einen moralischen Verfall bewirken kann“ (Brockhaus Enzyklopädie 1990: 386). 
The Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon’s definition regards corruption in an Institutio-
nal Economics context: Corruption is defined as “vertrags- bzw. normwidriges 
Verhalten eines Agenten gegenüber seinem Prinzipal aufgrund der Entgegen-
nahme von Geld oder Sachleistungen durch einen Dritten, der sich davon Vorteile 
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durch den Agenten erhofft“ (Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon: 1831). The Handwörter-
buch der Wirtschaftswissenschaft as the Brockhaus Enzyklopädie emphasizes 
moral aspects: „Tausch, Normenverstoß, Mißbrauch einer Vertrauensstellung und 
Heimlichkeit sind [also] die konstitutiven Merkmale von Korruption“ but additio-
nally, it refers to economic implications as the imperfection of (non-transparent) 
markets as well as corruption’s allocation and distribution effects (Handwörter-
buch der Wirtschaftswissenschaft: 565 – 572).  
The Lexikon der Politik gives a definition which is commonly used in recent 
publications. There corruption is “Mißbrauch öffentlicher Macht, Ämter, Mandate 
zum eigenen privaten Nutzen und/oder zum Vorteil Dritter durch rechtliche oder 
auch soziale Normenverletzungen, die i. d. R. geheim, gegen das öffentliche Inte-
resse gerichtet und zu Lasten des Gemeinwohls erfolgen“ (Nohlen 1998: 336). 
Arnold Heidenheimer was the first to categorize corruption definitions into 
three groups: public office-centered, market-centered and public interest-centered 
definitions (Heidenheimer 1970). Michael Johnston summarizes these definitions 
under the term “behavior-classifying” and adds Principal-Agent-Client definitions 
(PAC) and what he calls a neo-classic definition (Johnston 1996). 
Behavior-classifying definitions 
All behavior-classifying definitions refer to corruption as the “abuse of public 
office, power, or resources for private benefit” (Johnston 1996: 322). Similarly, 
Daniel Kaufmann defines it as “abuse of public office for private gain” 
(Kaufmann 1998: 131).  
Public office definitions 
Public office definitions are most often used and are rather “objective”. A person 
is corrupt when he or she violates formal rules of public offices to extract private 
gain. J. S. Nye’s version is most popular. He defines corruption as  
“behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-
regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates 
rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence” (Nye 1967: 
417).  
The advantage of public office definitions lies in their “objectivity” and thus, the 
relative clarity in their application: A set of rules is established. A violation of 
these rules is easy to identify, and personal gain in most cases, too. Nevertheless, 
public office definitions are criticized, namely for their non-conformity with 
public opinion. First, the motivation behind a corrupt act is neglected. Every act 
against the rules is considered corrupt, no matter how acceptable the rules are in 
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the public eye.6 Second, public office definitions are limited in their application to 
cross-country comparisons. Sanctioning behavior in contradiction to formal rules 
is seen as a specific Western attitude. In other cultures and in Western countries in 
the past, corruption was perceived very differently by the populace. Regarding anti-
corruption policies, an issue is raised since changing formal rules could legalize 
bribery or nepotism and this then would not be seen anymore as corrupt. 
Additionally, legislative corruption cannot be explained by these definitions (Kurer 
2003: 47).  
Market-centered definitions 
Market-centered definitions have been developed by those authors dealing with 
countries where “norms governing public officeholders are not clearly articulated 
or are nonexistent” (Heidenheimer, Johnston 2002: 8). Nathaniel Leff suggests 
that  
“[c]orruption is an extra-legal institution used by individuals or groups to gain influence 
over the actions of the bureaucracy. As such the existence of corruption per se indicates 
only that these groups participate in the decision-making process to a greater extent than 
would otherwise be the case” (Leff 1964: 8).  
Oskar Kurer considers these definitions as a sub-group of the category first 
mentioned and states that omitting the rules does not change the problem.  
Public interest definitions 
Public interest definitions are also rather „objective“. Carl Friedrich’s version can 
be assigned to this category.  
“The pattern of corruption can be said to exist whenever a power holder who is charged 
with doing certain things, i. e., who is a responsible functionary of officeholder, is by 
monetary or other rewards not legally provided for, induced to take actions which favor 
whoever provides the rewards and thereby does damage to the public and its interests.” 
(Friedrich 1966: 74).  
This definition considers country-specific differences but assumes an agreement 
on public interest which is unrealistic, at least in democratic societies. 
Public opinion definitions 
This category, in contrast to that mentioned above, is “subjective”, and thus 
applicable to various cultural contexts and times: An act is corrupt if the public 
condemns it, referring to Scott (1972: 3 – 4). Similarly to the public interest 
                                                 
6  The example of a Jew bribing his way out of a concentration camp is often cited in this context 
(Rose-Ackerman 1978: 9, Johnston 1996: 323). 
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definitions, the problem lies in the fact that a single public opinion does not exist 
which then makes the definition ambiguous.7 Conversely, Transparency 
International uses exactly this concept of subjective perceptions to measure and 
compare cross-country corruption levels for its Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI).8 Furthermore, information on how public service is perceived by the 
public, contributes to our understanding on existing norms and value. It provides 
deeper insight into the causes of corruption and may therefore be useful in the 
planning of country-specific anti-corruption campaigns.  
According to Johnston 1996, the problem with all behavior-classifying 
definitions is that they cannot be precise. Open questions will always remain: By 
what standards is the abuse of public office defined? What is public, what is 
considered private benefit? Responding to this deficit, Johnston introduces a new 
category: the Principal-Agent-Client definitions.  
Principal-agent-client definitions 
Principal-Agent-Client definitions (PAC) differ from behavior-classifying 
definitions in so far as the former analyze interactions between actors, rather than 
describing behavior patterns. It can be understood as a concept of the theory of 
Institutional Economics.  
Susan Rose-Ackerman first uses what was later called the PAC approach. She 
describes (corrupt) interactions in the following way:  
“While superiors would like agents always to fulfill the superior’s objectives, 
monitoring is costly, and agents will generally have some freedom to put their own 
interests ahead of their principals’. Here is where money enters. Some third person, who 
can benefit by the agent’s action, seek to influence the agent’s decision by offering him 
a monetary payment which is not passed on to the principal. The existence of such a 
payment does not necessarily imply that the principal’s goals have been subverted – 
indeed the payment may even increase the principal’s satisfaction with the agent’s 
performance. … Thus, my focus is not limited to payments that have been formally 
declared illegal. Rather it embraces all payments to agents that are not passed on to 
superiors. Nevertheless, many third party payments are illegal, and it is only these 
which I shall call ‘corrupt’.” (Rose-Ackerman 1978: 6 – 7).  
Rose-Ackerman’s corruption definition is narrow. It overlooks corruption where 
principals create conditions favorable for agents to extract money from clients and 
                                                 
7  Mark Philp illustrates this dilemma by noticing: “The norms of a local community may differ 
from those insisted on by a central authority or a political élite and they may differ between 
sections of the local population, either vertically [e. g., between different classes] or horizontally 
[different ethnic groups or segmented communities] or both (Philp 2002: 45). 
8  Therefore, Transparency International conducts interviews with business people and risk experts 
on how they perceive the quality of public services in different authorities etc. every year.  
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then expect a share out of the illegal income. Nevertheless, it gives us a broad 
overview of issues concerning PAC interactions.  
Robert E. Klitgaard’s definition is broader. He states that  
“[It] defines corruption in terms of the divergence between principal’s or public’s 
interests and those of the agent or civil servant: corruption occurs when an agent betrays 
the principal’s interest in pursuit to her own“ (Klitgaard 1988: 24).  
In a similar way, Arvind K. Jain formulates “corruption as manipulation of power 
of government or sale of government property, or both, by government officials 
for personal use” (Jain 1998: 18). 
Petra Stykow seizes the commonly used definition on the abuse of public office 
for private gain (Johnston 1996 and Kaufmann 1998) and discusses it under 
consideration of conflicts of interest, information and control asymmetry among 
principals, agents and clients. This leads her to a reformulation of the definition’s 
key words and to a broadening of the concept of corruption. First, she suggests the 
term “violation of a contract” instead of “abuse of public office” to include 
implicit or informal components of contracts. Second, she emphasizes 
“Beziehungsdyaden mit partieller Interessendifferenz” (Stykow 2002: 94) instead 
of institutionalized dichotomy between public and private sphere. Third, she 
considers egoism in the sense of self-interest as normality rather than deviant 
behavior.  
Johnston’s – as he calls it neo-classical – definition is in line with Stykow’s 
first reformulation as it considers formal institutions as well as social practice. He 
views corruption as a political and moral issue and defines it as “the abuse, 
according to the legal or social standards constituting a society’s system of public 
order, or a public role or resource for private benefit” (Johnston 1996: 331).  
To summarize the extensive and still ongoing debate on corruption definitions, 
it can be stated that the variation in definitions presents the wide range of country-
specific attitudes towards corruption and science-specific approaches to this 
phenomenon. Speaking in Kurer’s words “definition pluralism” (Kurer 2003: 50) 
illustrates the “divergence between formal rules on one side and social norms and 
values on the other” (Kurer 2003: 50).  
However, the author of this paper favors the PAC definition given by Rose-
Ackerman. When investigating administrative corruption at TSU, clients and 
agents are examined in order to make conclusions about their interests and 
restrictions. Illegal payments made by students or parents (clients) to influence 
university staff’s (agents’) decisions are considered corrupt acts.9 Whether or not 
shares are passed on to the principal will be secondary in my analysis.  
                                                 
9  Here the distinction between corruption and rent-seeking becomes clear. While most rent-seeking 
activities are legal (Krueger 1974) corruption is related to illegality. 
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Categories 
Corruption can be categorized according to certain key characteristics. Referring 
to Kaufmann (1998: 135 ff.), table 2 presents an overview of some dimensions 
that are relevant to the scope of my study. They are discussed in more detail in 
chapter 4, where corruption in Georgia’s higher education system is described. At 
this point the overview intends to provide dimensions to be examined when 
investigating specific cases.  
The characteristics of corruption may determine its consequences and also 
indicate potentials for anti-corruption strategies. In this respect, it is worthwhile to 
characterize corruption before looking for causes.  
The insight into definitions and categories will break new ground in the better 
understanding of the complex field of causes of corruption. The next chapter deals 
with theoretical approaches to this issue.  
Table 2: Key characteristics of corruption 
Parameter Possible parameter values 
Size high incidence low incidence 
Level of the Principal-Agent-
Client (PAC) pyramid 
political/grand administrative/petty 
Pervasiveness individualized systemic 
Organization centralized decentralized 
Predictability high low 
Roots history dependent factually based 
 
3 Causes of Corruption: Theoretical Approaches  
As much as corruption definitions differ among scholars, causes of corruption are 
also analyzed from various points of view. If corruption is seen as located “an den 
Schnittstellen zwischen Wirtschaft und Verwaltung” (Bluhm 2002: 181) neo-
classical economists, for example, may argue that reducing the state’s regulatory 
intervention in the economy lowers corruption. Sociologists and anthropologists 
on the other hand emphasize social norms and duties like gift exchange when 
explaining variations in corruption across societies.  
 
What Makes Georgia’s Higher Education System so Corrupt? 75 
Additionally, there is a strong debate continuing for years on whether or not 
institutions matter at all. Inveterate disputants like Jeffrey Sachs support an eco-
deterministic view by arguing that geographic variables more than institutions 
determine economic performance (Sachs 2003). In contrast, a recent paper by 
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson (2004) examine economic 
institutions, geography and culture as determinants of economic performance. The 
underlying assumption is that institutions determine the way a society is 
organized. This pattern affects individuals’ decision making in terms of whether 
they are encouraged to innovate, to take risks, to save for the future, to provide 
public goods or to educate themselves.  
Acemoglu et al. theoretically argue that political institutions are responsible for 
the allocation of political power and for setting constraints on power-holders. The 
allocation of power determines economic institutions which then are held relevant 
for economic performance. Additionally, they found empirical evidence for a 
positive correlation between protection against expropriation risk as a measure of 
property rights, and income. In contrast, geography, in terms of climate and 
diseases, and culture only play a secondary role for economic performance.10  
A final conclusion to this issue cannot be made. However, the author believes 
that institutions matter, which will be explained in more detail when discussing 
institutions and other factors as causes of corruption in the next sections.  
In addition to the varying schools of thought outlined above, the range of 
disciplines also contributes to a broad field of approaches. A diverse array appears 
when collecting factors that might be responsible for corruption. According to 
Kaufmann, table 3 depicts an overview of approaches to relevant disciplines and 
corresponding focuses of research (Kaufmann 1998: 143 f). Those approaches 
which are not being discussed later on in more detail are briefly illustrated here, 
with recent survey findings in the footnotes.  
                                                 
10  Edward Glaeser and Claudia Goldin incorporate both views. Assuming the scale of government 
and economy is exogenous – and thus doubt the relevance of institutions – they argue that its 
increase in the US during its early history led to a rise in corruption. Once rules rather than 
discretion counted, control bodies as well as greater competition among government officials 
were in place and the media functioned independently – which demonstrates an institutional 
change – the US were able to curb corruption and ranks among the least corrupt in the world now 
(Glaeser and Goldin 2004). 
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Table 3: Multidisciplinary focus on causes of corruption 
Approach Focus on 
Institutionalist approach - institutional legacy 
- historical ethical values 
Civil service management approach - salary of public officer 
- qualification of public officer 
- procedure of recruitment 
- discretionary power of public officer 
Lawyer’s approach - legislation 
- strength of enforcement bodies 
Public finance approach11, 12 - procurement procedure 
- tax regime 
- tariff regulation 
Political scientist approach13 - elections 
- political liberties 
- control rights 
Neoclassical economist approach14 - level of state intervention in the 
economy 
Sociologist approach15, 16 - civil society 
- press 
                                                 
11  Ades and Di Tella focus on state expenditures and conclude that “the extent to which public 
procurement is open to foreign bidders” and “the extent to which there is equal fiscal treatment to 
all enterprises” negatively correlates with the level of corruption (Ades and Di Tella 1997: 1030). 
12  Rose-Ackerman investigates the relationship between market structure and corruption, and finds 
that “when the government purchases a good also sold on the private market, the incentives for 
bribery are substantially less than those obtaining when government is the sole purchaser” (Rose 
Ackerman 1975: 202). 
13  Rose-Ackerman analyzes the impact of voting systems on corruption (Rose-Ackerman 1999). 
14  In a more recent article, Ades and Di Tella show that corruption is higher in countries where 
domestic firms are protected from foreign competition (Ades and Di Tella 1999). 
15  Michael Johnston emphasizes the importance of an active civil society by stating: „If government 
can be made accessible to opposition politicians, journalists, and members of the public, then 
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The institutionalist, the civil service management, and partly the lawyer’s 
approach will be applied to my own research on the higher education system in 
Georgia. In this regard, I will discuss certain theoretical aspects of what 
determines corruption more extensively. Chapter 3 is structured as follows: The 
civil management approach corresponds to the issue of wages with section 3.1. 
Additionally, I will discuss the impact of exogenous viewed variables – like 
personal and country characteristics – on corruption propensity. Other aspects – 
like the recruitment procedure and discretionary powers – are illustrated in section 
3.2 on formal institutions which are here understood as rules, regulations on 
administrative and decision making procedures. I also discuss the lawyer’s 
approach and the influence of legislation on corruption in this section. 
The institutionalist approach in Kaufmann covers both formal and informal 
institutions. The former are being added to section 3.2. Informal institutions, here 
defined as social norms, values, attitudes will be examined in section 3.3.  
Determining framework: wages, personal and country characteristics 
Before addressing institutions, this chapter deals with the influence of wages and 
exogenous factors like personal and country characteristics on corruption.  
Wage levels 
The relevance of adequate remuneration as a precondition for an honest civil 
service is widely recognized (Tanzi 2000, Klitgaard 1988). As civil servants might 
participate in corruption “due to greed and due to need” (Tanzi 2000: 118), the 
optimal wage rate for public officers is controversially discussed. In this context, 
two models leading to varying quantitative results are briefly presented.  
The “shirking model” by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) assumes rational public 
officers aim to maximize their income, in reference to “corruption due to greed”. 
If bribes are high, and the probability of detection – as well as resulting penalties – 
are low, the model predicts the eradication of corruption by means of wage 
increases to be very expensive for the state budget. 
The “fair wage model”, in contrast, assumes that public officers are not 
motivated by greed but by the perception of being remunerated unfairly (Akerlof 
and Yellen 1990). This suggests that raising wages to a fair level may reduce 
corruption to a minimum. Similarly, increasing wages to a minimum level might 
                                                                                                                                     
checks and balances will be not only an administrative mechanism to counter corruption but a 
mechanism with support from powerful forces in society (Johnston 1999: 18). 
16  Brunetti and Weder found that a higher freedom of the press is associated with less corruption. 
(Brunetti and Weder 2003). 
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limit “corruption due to need”. Caroline van Rijckeghem and Beatrice Weder 
argue that low wages force public officers to supplement their incomes illicitly, 
while high wages imply higher losses when getting caught (van Rijckeghem and 
Weder 1998). 
Paying fair wages might not be limited to having direct positive effects on the 
level of corruption. Since corruption is often condoned by societies where wages 
are unrealistically low, fair wages might challenge public opinion to condemn 
corruption and support detection, indirectly leading to its reduction.  
Van Rijckeghem and Weder investigated the impact of public sector pay on the 
extent of corruption empirically. They assembled a data set on the ratio of 
government wages relative to manufacturing wages for 28 low income countries. 
Checking for a broad variety of proxies they find a significant “negative 
association between relative civil service wages and corruption” (van Rijckeghem 
and Weder 1998: 14).17 This result contradicts the shirking model which predicts 
no significant correlation between wages and corruption. The fair wage hypothesis 
also appears not to hold for low wages “if bribe levels are also low and/or the 
probability of detection and penalties are high” (van Rijckeghem and Weder 1998: 
21). Thus, the implications for wage policy are ambivalent, especially as corrupt 
governments tend to face strong budgetary restrictions and perceive their staff as 
capable of extracting sufficient income already.  
Olivier Cadot also finds a negative correlation between wage rates and 
corruption by modeling corruption as a bilateral gamble, where the official asks 
for a bribe every time, whilst fearing that she or he may be reported and punished 
by a superior officer (Cadot 1987).  
In this context, Vito Tanzi emphasizes the limits of wage policy by arguing that 
“high wages may reduce the number of corrupt acts, while they may lead to 
demands for higher bribes on the part of those who continue to be corrupt” – 
because as wages increase, the opportunity cost of losing one’s job (and higher 
income) increases as well.(Tanzi 2000: 119). Therefore, depending on the 
elasticity of demand for bribes, the total amount of money paid illegally does not 
necessarily fall due to higher wages for civil servants. 
Shifting from pure wage considerations to more general economic 
examinations, the findings by Jens Chr. Andvig and Karl Ove Moene are 
especially interesting. Their model generates the impact of the profitability of 
corruption on its frequency and highlights that a temporary shift may lead to 
                                                 
17  Similarly, Assar Lindbeck attributes the low level of corruption in Sweden in the 20th century 
partly to the fact, that high-level administrators received an income 12 to 15 times higher than the 
wages of an average industrial worker at the turn of the century (Lindbeck 1998). 
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permanent changes in corruption (Andvig and Moene 1990). These results may 
explain the spread and persistence of corruption in some countries.  
Public officers’ remuneration may be seen as a crucial determinant when 
discussing corruption policy because it is a variable adjustable by government. 
There are however, other exogenous factors to be examined when discussing the 
factors favorable to corruption. In this context, a very recent survey by Naci 
Mocan (2004) examines personal and country characteristics, and their impact on 
the risk of exposure to bribery.  
Personal characteristics 
Regarding personal characteristics, Mocan finds from a micro-level data set from 
49 countries that highly educated and wealthy individuals are more likely to be 
asked for a bribe as their income opportunities are considered to be higher (Mocan 
2004). In contrast, a country’s human capital level in general tends to be 
negatively associated with corruption. Thus, educated agents are seen to be less 
tolerant of corruption. 
Mocan adds that men are found to be more corrupt since women have a 
tendency to be less active in the labor market and also less engaged in criminal 
activities which implies that they have to tolerate illegal activities to a much 
smaller extent. Anand Swamy and others investigated gender aspects in more 
detail. Using cross-country data they show that “corruption is less severe where 
women hold a larger share of parliamentary seats and senior positions in the 
government” (Swamy et al. 2001: 25).18 The authors further used micro data to 
draw conclusions concerning the gender-based acceptability of corruption. They 
find that 77.3 % of women believe that illegal or dishonest behavior is “never 
justifiable” whereas only 72.4 % of men agree with this thesis (Swamy et al. 2001: 
28).19 Although the empirical findings outlined above appear significant and 
robust, explanations about why women have a tendency to be less corrupt are very 
vague.20 Additionally, Swamy et al. cautiously suggest that the presence of 
                                                 
18  The women’s proportion in parliament and government affects the incidence of corruption in 
different ways. First, legislative corruption itself presents a relevant dimension of political 
corruption, and second, the parliament influences corruption in terms of passing anti-corruption 
laws, setting corruption on the public agenda or encouraging civil society to focus on this issue. 
The government has impact on administrative corruption by recruiting lower-level officials and 
on political corruption by formulating and enforcing anti-corruption laws. 
19  Swamy et al. used the World Value Surveys where data were collected in developed and 
developing countries in the early 1980s and the early 1990s. 
20  Simplified, sociological vs. biological arguments dominate the debate. For more details, see 
Paternoster and Simpson 1996 or Jaggar 1983). 
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women in public life might reduce corruption “at least in the short or medium 
term” (Swamy et al. 2001: 26).  
Mocan also suggests that public officers in larger cities may be more 
frequently involved in corruption since economic activity is more significant and 
the relationship between client and agent is less personal which according to 
Mocan, makes it easier for public officers to ask for bribes.21
Personality is an important factor for research on causes of political corruption 
by Donatella Della Porta and Alessandro Pizzorno. They look for the required 
capabilities for a politician becoming involved in corruption by concluding from 
investigations on political corruption in local government in Italy. Notably they 
find that “variations in the willingness of people to be corrupted, and therefore on 
what we would prefer to call the moral cost (as seen by them) of participation, is 
more influential than the structure of opportunities” (Della Porta and Pizzorno 
1996: 87). They outline skills in illegality22 and networking23 as required abilities 
for participating in corruption. From their findings it can be summarized that a 
person’s reference group plays a very important role for his or her participation in 
corruption: The moral cost of becoming involved in corruption will be lower – and 
thus the likelihood of participating in corrupt deals will be higher – a) if an 
individual enjoys a rather low social status within his or her reference group, b) if 
the person is a newcomer in this group, who consequently, seeks to escape her or 
his disadvantaged position in relation to established colleagues, c) if civic values 
uphold by the reference group are less homologous, and finally d) if exit from the 
group is less distressing for that person.24 Although this survey focuses on 
political corruption the findings can be applied to administrative corruption too, as 
skills in illegality and networking are required there as well. 
Country characteristics 
Findings from the article “Corruption” by Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny 
will be discussed in more detail in the next section. Here, some conclusions 
concerning the impact of a country’s characteristics on corruption are explored. 
Shleifer and Vishny argue that countries with a strong police, a small oligarchy 
                                                 
21  This association can be put in doubt as a close relationship might also minimize the risk of 
detection.  
22  Skills in illegality contain i. e. knowledge of people willing to participate in illegal deals, ability 
to act under stress of being detected, and resoluteness to intimidate citizens if necessary. 
23  Here, “sociability” and “arrogance” are included. 
24  For further reading on “voice” and “exit” as strategies for individuals as members of groups, 
Hirschman (1970) is suggested.  
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and a homogeneous society tend to face a more organized form of corruption. 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1993: 609). Mauro provides contrary empirical evidence in 
terms of the homogeneity of a society. Using data on ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization he finds that “[t]he presence of many different ethnolinguistic 
groups is […] significantly associated with worse corruption, as bureaucrats may 
favor members of their same group” (Mauro 1995: 693).  
In terms of government structure, Mocan refers to Weingast and Tanzi, 
respectively, and states that the impact of a centralized vs. decentralized 
government is unclear. According to Weingast a federal system is associated with 
a more honest government because it supports competition among various 
jurisdictions (Weingast 1995). On the other hand, Tanzi argues that a federal 
system might be more corrupt as there is more interaction between clients and 
government officials at the local level and “there are fewer centralized forces to 
enforce honesty” (Mocan 2004: 7, referring to Tanzi 1995).25 Along the same 
lines, a large government provides more potential for interactions and resulting 
corrupt deals. 
Taking into account a country’s endowment of raw material, Ades and Di Tella 
indicate that these assets provide potential for government officials to extract 
lucrative rents and, thus rent-seeking behavior might lead to corruption and spread 
to other state sectors, too (Ades and Di Tella 1999).  
A high level of corruption is also expected in countries with an interrupted 
democracy and the incidence of war in recent history (Mocan 2004). Regime 
changes usually imply a shift of power. In the transition process to a market 
economy, for example, the old elite looses control over former state resources. 
Privatization procedures are especially prone to corrupt practice. In particular 
wars in recent history and the absence of the rule of law create destabilizing 
effects. Once a war economy is established, warlords can enjoy high profits from 
smuggling drugs or weapons, from trafficking, or from the exploitation of natural 
resources (known as “Ressourcenfluch”). The networks among the participating 
actors are likely to remain in place in peace times. Thus when former warlords 
gain power within a new state structure they may still be in charge of or involved 
in the resource field and open to – what in peace times is called – corruption.26  
                                                 
25  The latter argument, in particular, has to be doubted as there is no evidence that central 
government officials are less corrupt. Just Georgia is a good example to illustrate the vertical flow 
of bribes up to the top level. 
26  Pranab Bardhan investigates the opposite causality between bad governance and war. He 
identifies an institutional failure in terms of the disappearance of mediating institutions as 
political parties as well as an electoral and constitutional system setting disincentives for 
mediating (Bardhan 1997: 65 – 94). 
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Finally, a country’s status as a beneficiary of international aid should be 
considered. Robert E. Klitgaard (1990) describes how political leaders choose to 
extract huge sums of development credits to transfer them to their own or to their 
relatives’ pockets once even advisors from international organizations turn out to 
be more concerned about their own careers than about the country’s reality. 
Formal institutions 
Much effort has been made by international donors to establish a framework of 
appropriate institutions in developing and transition countries. Still, it is a 
controversial topic whether or not the adjustment of formal institutions has 
improved governance in the countries addressed.  
The author views institutions as essential for a country’s performance in terms 
of governance as well as economic development. Therefore, this chapter deals 
with theoretical approaches on how formal institutions might have an impact on 
corruption.  
As corruption appears in bureaucracies, it is argued that reducing the size of the 
state structure will limit corruption. It is certainly true that economic performance, 
especially among small and middle-sized enterprises in some transition countries, 
suffers from an oversized state apparatus. Still, just reducing the size of this 
bureaucracy does not solve the problem of corruption. “Rather the way the state 
operates and carries out its functions is far more important than the size of public 
service activity.” (Tanzi 2000: 112)  
As the focus of my research is on petty corruption in the higher education 
system in Georgia, and thus at the administrative level, I will concentrate on 
administrative corruption as well when discussing the theoretical background on 
this issue.27  
                                                 
27  Concerning political corruption, some approaches are briefly summarized for the interested 
reader: Political corruption, in most cases, involves the state budget. Concerning public 
expenditures corruption may occur where huge investment projects are assigned or procurement 
contracts are signed, and the tender is not fair. In these cases, not the cost-effective and high-
quality proposal wins the award but the offers by high ranking government officials’ supporters. 
Additionally, if the governments are engaged in provision of goods and services at below the 
market prices, i. e. credit, electricity, water, access to educational facilities or public land, or 
special forms of pensions, government officials face opportunities to favor their relatives or 
politically loyal persons over entitled and vulnerable. Referring to state revenues, much 
emphasize has been put on research on taxation. In the context of political corruption, decision 
power over tax exceptions or on special conditions allows officials to extract extraordinary bribes. 
For all cases mentioned above, it is argued that lack of transparency over administrative 
procedures as well as a high discretionary power enjoyed by government officials in key positions 
and possibly a lack of appropriate legislation are responsible for unjustified enrichment by 
officials (Rose-Ackerman 1975, Tanzi 1998). 
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Legislation as norm-setting instrument 
Clearly legislation determines the way a society, and this includes the 
bureaucracy, is supposed to function. Ades and Di Tella investigate correlations 
between the independence of a judicial system and corruption (Ades and Di Tella 
1996). The World Development Report 1997 concentrates its research on the 
quality of legislation. Using a private sector survey they find that the predictability 
of the judiciary significantly affects the level of corruption (World Bank 1997: 
104). 
Vito Tanzi (2000) states that a wide range of requirements, including licenses, 
permits and authorization exists in many countries, in transition and developing 
countries in particular. If a person wishes to open a shop, to travel abroad, to 
borrow money, or participate in foreign trade or just to drive a car, a certain 
authorization is required. The need to obtain these certifications provides officials 
with a certain power over the applicants (sometimes indeed, a monopoly). By 
delaying decisions or even refusing authorizations, bribes can be extracted from 
those who need the permits. This problem reflects a government’s regulatory 
framework which often lacks coherence and/or might be difficult to understand. 
This leads to the issue of lucidity and transparency in laws, rules and 
procedures. Many are confusing, or often not publicly available, or changes are 
not properly announced. The more opaque the regulations, the more time that has 
to be spent at the authorities’ offices to clarify imprecise issues. Where there is a 
more frequent agent-client communication one party might choose to avoid the 
lawful but time-consuming procedures to “get things done more quickly” by 
illegal means. 
Unfortunately, public officers profit from a lack of lucidity and transparency, 
and even more from inconsistencies in administrative instructions. The possibility 
of different interpretations provides the bureaucrat with a high level of 
discretionary power. It is assumed that an increase in discretionary power leads to 
more subjective decisions, and thus correlates with increased potential to extract 
bribes to influence these decisions.  
The issue of discretionary power becomes especially relevant if the public 
officer makes decisions concerning access to public goods or services below 
market price, and other exemptions. Besides access to educational facilities in the 
non-payment sector which will be discussed in my case study in chapter 4, other 
examples include the free provision of electricity or water, access to disability 
pensions, to land or public housing, or the exemption from tax payments. 
Nevertheless, the legislation is a normative concept only. Although appropriate 
laws and regulations are necessary for authorities to carry out their duties in a 
proper way, their existence does not guarantee compliance with them. Even after 
legal reforms the extent of corruption typically does not change.  
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Vertical and horizontal relationships of the principal-agent-client structure 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Olson (1993) and Tanzi (2000), among others, outline 
various other formal institutions that are assumed to have an impact on corruption. 
As it will become clear in chapter 4, the internal structure of public administration, 
as well as the relationship of its agents to the principal on one hand and the clients 
on the other, is of greatest significance.  
In the spirit of Institutional Economics and referring to the Principal-Agent 
model, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny analyze the relationship among the 
agents. Their model describes officials as independent monopolists, joint 
monopolists and officials in competition. In the first case different state agencies 
provide public goods or services independently and take the other agency’s sales 
as given, whereas joint monopolists take into account the effects of an extra unit 
sold by the other officials. Regarding the level of each bribe, they conclude that 
competition among officials leads to the lowest level of bribes, joint monopoly to 
an intermediate level and independent monopoly to the highest level of bribes. But 
the total amount of revenues collected is higher in the case of joint than in 
independent monopoly (Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Nevertheless, the sum 
extracted by independent monopolists becomes very high when the 
complementarity of public goods can be artificially created. In these cases, 
“opportunities for corruption stimulate the entry of permit-dispensers armed with 
new regulations” Bardhan 1997: 19).28
Bardhan refers to this concept and explains the increase in the inefficiency of 
post-Soviet Russia by a change in the internal structure of the administrative 
system after the collapse of the Soviet Union. While “the Communist Party 
centralised the collection of bribes and effectively monitored (sometimes with the 
help of the KGB (the State Security Committee of the former Soviet Union) 
deviations from “agreed” patterns of corruption. Today, the different ministries, 
agencies and levels of local government all set their own bribes independently in a 
decentralised attempt to maximise their own revenue.” (Bardhan 1997: 19) This is 
an interesting observation which will be picked up in chapter 4 to establish 
whether or not it is applicable to administrative corruption at Georgia’s higher 
education system.  
While Shleifer and Vishny investigate the horizontal relationships among the 
agents, Mancur Olson provides a very interesting insight into vertical agent-
clients relationships. He introduces a time horizon to distinguish between two 
agents: The “roving bandit” is concerned about the present, only. For him, 
                                                 
28  Bardhan illustrates his observation as follows: “… just when you think you have bribed two 
agencies to get the required two permits, another independent monopolist comes along and tells 
you that you need a third permit from him …” (Bardhan 1997: 19). 
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extracting money out of his subjects is a one-time game: Once he exhausts his 
domain he “roves” further. The “stationary bandit”, in contrast, has an 
“encompassing interest” (Olson 1993: 569) in his domain in the long term. It pays 
him to invest into his domain by providing public goods like security, as this 
investment generates more income and gives incentives to save which then 
increases the potential for further extractions. Although Olson discusses the issue 
of governors aiming to maximize their tax revenue, the concept is also applicable 
to state officials trying to maximize the amount of bribes.  
Returning to Shleifer and Vishny and taking into consideration the relationship 
between agents and the principal they identify two cases of corruption: “without 
theft” and “with theft”.29 In the former, the total price equals the official price 
plus a bribe. The bribe goes into the official’s pocket while the official price is 
transferred to the state budget. The latter case implicates a bribe lower than the 
official price, and the official does not turn over anything to the government. He 
or she makes profit out of the whole revenue. Concerning the spread of corruption, 
Shleifer and Vishny conclude that corruption with theft is “more persistent” as it 
“aligns the interests of the buyers and the sellers” (Shleifer, Vishny 1993: 604). 
Additionally, they emphasize the competition among the officials as well as 
among the buyers in the case of theft: If officials had to pay to get the job at the 
initial stage, they are “forced” to clear the expenses by demanding bribes. Buyers 
in the case of theft, on the other hand, will not be competitive in the market if their 
expenses for certain public goods or services exceed those of their competitors.  
Presumably, bribing into Georgia’s higher education system, at least in the 
non-payment sector, is best described as “corruption without theft”, but as 
administrative corruption is more complex chapter 4 will deal with it more 
concretely.  
Monitoring and punishment as a control mechanism 
A further formal institution being discussed as a cause of corruption is whether or 
not there is institutional control. The media or an anti-corruption commissions, for 
example, could function in this respect. This approach of external “voice” to 
improve the quality of service and reduce corruption is supported by Kaufmann, 
Mehrez, and Gurgur (2002) in their empirical micro-survey of public officials 
within a country. This paper will concentrate on control bodies inside 
organizations. It is assumed that the existence of internal institutional control 
                                                 
29  Ingo Pies picks up the approach of corruption with and without theft. He calls the two cases 
Entlastungs- (EK) und Belastungskorruption (BK) and concludes that EK implicates harmony of 
interests while BK goes along with conflict of interests between the official and the private client 
(Pies 2002). 
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might reduce corruption by monitoring, supporting publicity and punishing 
offences. Independence from political influence as well as the power to enforce 
penalties are seen as essential for any success. 
Theoretically, higher penalties are supposed to discourage agents and clients 
from involvement in corrupt deals. A number of issues remain however that cast 
doubt on this strategy. First, as discussed in the context of wage increases, the 
introduction of “higher penalties may reduce the number of corrupt acts but they 
may additionally lead to demands for higher bribes” (Tanzi 2000: 120 f.). Second, 
in reality only a few officials have ever been penalized and the administrative 
procedures to punish corrupt government officials is slow and cumbersome and 
can cost friends and social capital. Third, judges themselves might be susceptible 
to bribes. Fourth, the probability of being punished at all decreases as more 
officials are involved in corruption, “since it is cheaper to be discovered by a 
corrupt than by a non-corrupt superior” (Bardhan 1997: 30).  
Informal institutions 
Informal institutions present the opaque complement to rather easily accessible 
formal institutions. The former results from history, traditions, culture and varies 
in terms of country and history. Informal institutions influence individuals’ and 
societies’ values, preferences and beliefs. Due to their vagueness, academic 
literature on this aspect tends to be descriptive and anecdotal. Although historical 
sources on bureaucracy, culture and tradition exist, their impact on contemporary 
corruption-promoting institutions has not yet been researched in detail. This 
chapter provides an overview. 
The roots of current informal institutions discussed below date back to the 
beginning of bureaucracy, but cover legacies from the Soviet period too. It is 
intended here to distinguish the discussion of informal institutions as causes of 
corruption between pre-Soviet traditions, Soviet legacy, and Post-Soviet practice – 
although the borders appear to be blurred in practice. 
Informal institutions of pre-Soviet origin 
In chapter 3.2.1 the legislation is discussed in the context of formal institutions. 
The impact of current laws, rules and regulations on corruption are examined. This 
chapter, in contrast, investigates historical traditions of different law systems as 
informal institutions. It considers whether the formulation and original intent of 
laws matter for today’s legislative development. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) compare the Anglo-Saxon common law system and 
the civil law system which is often found in continental Europe. La Porta et al. 
(1998) argue that the common law system developed in England in the 17th 
century has been shaped by the parliament and aristocracy at the expense of the 
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crown … As a consequence, British common law puts emphasis on individuals’ 
private and property rights, and intends to limit, rather than strengthen, the power 
of the state. … In comparison, French civil law, Scandinavian civil law and 
German civil law are designed as instruments of the state to expand its power; and 
socialist law is manifestation of the state’s intent to create institutions to maintain 
power and extract resources without regard for protecting economic interests” 
(Mocan 2004: 6). Thus, individuals under continental-European and especially 
socialist law are expected to face a higher level of corruption.  
Additionally, Daniel Treisman is interested in exploring how far the practice of 
law enforcement – he terms it “legal culture” (Treisman 2000: 402) – differs. He 
mentions “an almost obsessive focus on the procedural aspects of law” in Britain, 
whereas “respect for hierarchy and the authority of offices” are much more 
relevant in other cultures (Treisman 2000: 403). This aspect of legal culture is 
seen as a second reason why individuals under British-influenced laws are less 
likely to face corruption.  
Shifting from the origin of legislation to the original practice of bureaucracy, 
Susanne Schattenberg focuses on the issue that “[b]is zur Einführung des 
Beamtenlohnes zu Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts […] es in Russland nicht nur üb-
lich, sondern vom Landesherren vorgesehen [war], dass der Beamte vom Bittstel-
ler, dem er einen Dienst erbrachte, bezahlt wurde” (Schattenberg 2003: 86). Thus, 
the common practice, or even the requirement, to earn income by using one’s 
position before public sector wages were introduced might explain why individual 
payments for public service are still common in bureaucracies influenced by the 
Russian practice in the 18th century.  
Finally, religion as an informal institution might also have an impact on public 
officials behavior today. Treisman identifies two scenarios. First, he argues that 
religion may determine attitudes towards social hierarchies. In Catholicism, Islam, 
and Eastern Orthodoxy which are predominantly hierarchical, loyalty to family 
members might be higher than to unknown individuals or office requirements. 
Protestantism, in contrast, is seen as more egalitarian and individualistic as to 
favor spouses. This difference may affect the level of nepotism. Second, Protes-
tantism developed in opposition to state-supported religion and thus functioned as 
a monitoring institution to denounce abuse by state officials. In other religions, 
state and church were more intertwined and state activities were monitored much 
less (Treisman 2000: 403). In this context, Acemoglu et al. (2004) emphasize Pro-
testantism’s idea of predestination. This combined with high values of hard work 
and thrift can be interpreted as opposing corrupt practice (Acemoglu et al. 2004: 15). 
Soviet legacy 
The relevance of Soviet legacy for the current persistence of corruption can best 
be understood by focusing on its functionality. Sociologists often examine 
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corruption as deviant behavior. Durkheim (1984), for example, argues that deviant 
behavior is functional for a society, even if only to initiate a condemning sanction 
to confirm the validity of social norms. For Ilja Srubar, corruption presents a sys-
tem induced but also a system stabilizing mechanism. He summarizes as follows:  
„Wir finden [...] im Realsozialismus Osteuropa allgemein eine systeminduzierte, d. h. 
durch die Einparteienherrschaft und die Planwirtschaft [Mangelwirtschaft, the author] 
hervorgebrachte, spontan regulierte Alltagskultur der Korruption vor, auf deren Netz-
werken in unterschiedlichem Maße organisierte Korruptionsformen aufbauen, die von 
Land zu Land in ihrer Verbreitung und Reichweite variieren. Systemisches Niveau er-
reichen die Korruptionsformen im realen Sozialismus insofern, als sie von der kommu-
nistischen Parteielite als ein Versorgungsmechanismus [der Betriebe zur Planerfüllung, 
the author] toleriert und als ein Herrschaftsmittel [Verhinderung eines Systemsturzes, 
Konzentrierung der Bevölkerung auf Konsum, anstatt auf politische Proteste, the author] 
einkalkuliert werden“ (Srubar 2003: 161). 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) pick up the issue of shortage under socialism. In 
contrast to Srubar, they focus on actors instead of structures and assume rational, 
self-interested socialist planners and firm managers. As both respond to incentives 
and neither is able to maintain official profits out of selling goods, they are 
interested in cutting output and prices in order to maximize unofficial profits, 
namely bribes. These mechanisms are still applicable for the public services. 
Artificial shortages or procedural delays, inherited from the Socialist period, 
create opportunities to extract bribes. Here, the Soviet legacy, as an informal 
institution, may have influenced the establishment of formal institutions and may 
still determine bureaucratic practice. 
Ingrid Oswald also argues in the spirit of an actors-centered theory. She comes 
from what she calls “Korruptionstriade” (Oswald 2002: 43), the hierarchical 
structure between a principal, an agent and a client, and applies this approach to 
Russia. Referring to Kordonskij (2000), Oswald identifies the roots of 
“administrative markets” as being the parallel structure of administrative and 
political hierarchies during the Soviet period. Every administrative instruction had 
to be confirmed by political authorities, and every such directive was adjustable 
and suspendable. In this way, power had preference over the rule of law which in 
turn led to the establishment of a strong discretionary power within authorities. 
The dominance of power over law survived the collapse of the Soviet Union as an 
informal institution which still prevails: When obtaining certain administrative 
services the client faces an official price plus an additional rate the agents demand 
for proceeding with the request. The principal, here defined as the agent’s 
superior, condones this deviant behavior or is not capable of eliminating it.30  
                                                 
30  The effects of „administrative markets“ are especially devastating when looking at the 
privatization of state property. Not only state assets were sold this way but also rights to further 
regulate the privatization procedure.  
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Another informal institution established during the Soviet period and still 
prevalent today is what Ledeneva (1998) terms blat’. Blat’ is understood as the 
usage of personal contacts in order to get access to public resources whilst formal 
procedures are avoided. Blat’ takes place in everyday life, and amongst family 
members, friends and neighbors at a socially lower level. Thus, blat’ appears 
predominantly at a horizontal level, but the vertical aspect becomes apparent when 
entering the public sphere. Here, blat’ practice continues among colleagues 
(“kleiner Dienstweg” Oswald 2002: 58), and might lead to corrupt practice by 
affecting decisions that public officers have to make.31  
Post-Soviet phenomena 
Pervasive corruption implies institutional weakness.32 Under conditions where the 
state monopoly of violence is almost absent, “markets of violence” (Elwert 1997) 
are likely to appear, and strong pseudo police forces are able to gain power: das 
“Gewaltunternehmertum”. Although a network of so-called thieves-in-law was 
already established and active during the Soviet period, Gewaltunternehmer are 
only seen as temporarily predominant over state authorities in certain regions 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Gewaltunternehmer use or threaten 
violence in order to provide security or ensure contract enforcement, and gain 
profit out of these (entrepreneurial) activities. Referring again to Oswald’s 
“Korruptionstriade”, she argues that the principal as normative guarantor for 
security is not in place. Instead, private individuals compete for this position, and 
are able to compel agents as well as clients to pay (monetarily or by using political 
influence) for their services. It is questionable whether corruption is a cause or a 
consequence of Gewaltunternehmertum. Nevertheless, the threat of violence may 
have an impact on government officials’ decisions.  
                                                 
31  Nevertheless, the impact of blat’ is discussed controversially. According to Oswald, individuals 
availing themselves of this practice usually emphasize its necessary and altruistic character. 
Intended and calculated reciprocity is often denied. Still, individuals without this privileged 
access to public goods have to bear the costs (Oswald 2002: 56 f). 
http://en.thinkexist.com/quotations/ University/ 
32  It should be noted that this view is challenged by Barbara Christophe. She disagrees that state 
failure to enforce laws or to protect public resources is due to its weakness. Contrarily, she 
interprets this malfunctioning as for the acting elites cost-efficient option of state-building 
(Christophe 2003: 8). 
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Where informal institutions are very influential … 
While the last three sections attempted to categorize informal institutions histori-
cally, two further phenomena which suggest the importance of informal institutions 
are discussed here: the quality of the bureaucracy and the perception of corruption. 
“Absence of politically motivated hiring, patronage and nepotism, and clear 
rules on promotion and hiring … contribute to the quality of a bureaucracy.” 
(Tanzi 2000: 118) These factors again depend on the incentive structure and 
traditions. What Tanzi argues theoretically, Peter B. Evans and James E. Rauch 
(1996) demonstrate empirically: Meritocratic recruitment significantly determines 
bureaucratic performance.33 It is expected that those entering the civil service 
through a formal examination system, for example, experience that merit is valued 
highly by superiors. Therefore, the new recruit is likely to have a higher degree of 
work morality, and might be less inclined to engage in corruption. In contrast, 
individuals employed within the state structure as a result of nepotism are likely to 
reciprocate, and thereby to favor relatives or benefactors over entitled persons. 
Bardhan confirms this statement. He observed that “allegiance to kinship-based or 
clan-based loyalties often take precedence over public duties even for salaried 
public officials” (Bardhan 1997: 28). 
According to Srubar, it cannot be expected that contemporary established 
corrupt structures will vanish in the near future. Governments are able to place 
anti-corruption issues on their agendas but a new policy will only influence formal 
institutions in the short term. Due to what is termed cultural lag (Ogburn 1964), 
societies tend to keep informal institutions once they are perceived as functional. 
This perception again depends to a certain degree on how many other people 
we expect to be corrupt (Bardhan 1997: 28). Once corruption’s collective 
reputation is positive, a society can easily fall into a vicious circle where more and 
more individuals are captured. To diminish informal institutions as causes for 
corruption, positive examples set by the leadership (Tanzi 2000: 121) and the 
commitment to corporate goals (Evans and Rauch 2000: 52) are seen as helpful.  
Summarizing the discussion on the possible causes of corruption, it can be 
stated that every option is worth keeping in mind when investigating the reality of 
a particular situation. The next chapter deals with Georgia’s higher education 
system. The theoretical approaches examined above are applied to identify the 
causes of pervasive corruption in this sector. The internal structure within 
Georgia’s higher education system will be the main focus. 
                                                 
33  The impact of competitive salaries as well as career stability, in contrast, do not have such huge 
influence (Evans and Rauch 1996). 
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4 Application to Georgia’s Higher Education System 
Administrative structures of state bureaucracies are difficult to see through, 
especially as a foreigner. As a researcher one is confronted with hidden 
hierarchies, unknown “rules of the game”, different mentalities and dos and 
don’ts, and all at the same time. Thus, research requires a certain previous 
knowledge of overall issues of the country and even more urgent access to the 
field of interest. For me as a student, it turned out that the higher education system 
was the best option to conduct research without ending up having no more than a 
selective insight into the structure. The administrative level of corruption from the 
tuition phase to the final grades appeared as particularly interesting as the way 
students enter seems to be significant for the whole study time up to receiving the 
final diploma. Additionally, sums paid for entering universities can be as high as 
20,000 USD at the Law faculty at TSU, for example. Furthermore, the 
administrative level seems more accessible in comparison to the fields of 
university funds and procurements which is related to the examination of political 
corruption. I have chosen TSU as a case study for my research as it is the largest 
and most prestigious state university in Georgia.  
Methodology 
The findings of my research are based on primary as well as secondary resources. 
I have stayed in Georgia twice: for an internship in 2002 and for this field research 
in 2004, in total five months. For basic knowledge of the country’s specificity I 
extensively familiarized myself with various reports and news, and with personal 
contacts. 
Some research on the education sector has already been conducted. The 
International Institute for Education Policy, Planning and Management (EPPM), 
which supports the educational reform in Georgia by research, policy analysis and 
consultation, produced some relevant reports on certain issues of the education 
system. A recent publication by the Transnational Crime and Corruption Center 
(TraCCC), Georgia Office’s former director Ketevan Rostiashvili provides very 
detailed material on corruption at the political and administrative level at TSU and 
also gives background information on Georgian anti-corruption legislation and the 
origin of corruption during the Soviet period. A detailed data report designed by 
the Copenhagen Business School (and now the basis for the education reform) 
provides very useful information on the aspects of labor market adequate syllabi, 
teaching methods and curricula, and education management. Additionally, the 
Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA) as well as the Chamber of 
Control investigated the education system. Their focus was rather more at a level 
of political corruption, meaning the usage of funds. Lastly, some articles have 
appeared in the local press from time to time.  
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The sources mentioned above provide background information on legal, 
political, economic and institutional issues in the education sector. The question of 
causes of corruption has not risen, yet. Thus, stakeholder interviews (see: 
appendix 1) were conducted in order to collect more precise information on 
administrative practice and experiences by those involved. Stakeholders are 
classified into two groups: experts (third party) and those personally involved. The 
former group contains representatives of Transparency International (TI), 
American University’s Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC), 
GYLA, and the Chamber of Control. Additionally, scholars in charge of the World 
Bank reform project34 and representatives of the Ministry of Education and 
Science provided useful information on the reform plan. The group of personally 
involved individuals includes students, their parents and the teaching staff of TSU. 
Research on corruption at Georgia’s higher education system is only just 
beginning. Due to the limitation of data available and collectable no quantitative 
analysis is possible. Furthermore the topic is delicate, and explosive questions 
cannot be posed directly. That is why all interviews were designed as narrative 
interviews and led to qualitative statements. Any numbers like sizes of bribes 
given by interview partners might be estimated and could not be verified. Most of 
the interviews were conducted in English, Russian or German. Two interview 
partners preferred to speak in Georgian and their responses were translated into 
English. The interviews were held from August until October 2004.  
Empirical research faces certain limits relating to time and the reliability of the 
information collected. As a Magisterarbeit is supposed to be written within five 
months my field stay was limited and so was the number of interview partners. I 
still was able to receive a detailed and reliable picture of who is in what way 
involved in the entrance procedure and what interests are predominant. 
Concerning the reliability of information I carefully double checked answers given 
to me during interviews and outside of interviews. 
Georgia and its Higher Education System  
This section provides a short overview on the state building process in Georgia 
and the situation of the higher education system. 
Georgia declared its independence from the former Soviet Union on April 9, 
1991. Zviad Gamsakhurdia became the first elected president but was deposed in 
the aftermath of the fighting in central Tbilisi between government troops and 
opposition militias a few months later. Eduard Shevardnadze, minister of internal 
                                                 
34  The two interview partner in charge of the World Bank project very especially helpful as they 
were additionally working within the university structure and had studied in Georgia as well as 
abroad.  
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affairs in the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic from 1964 to 1972, returned from 
Moscow35 and became the new president. Major reforms towards market economy 
were conducted but the political and economic performance remain insufficient.  
With Shevardnadze’s return to Georgia the old nomenclature regained 
substantial influence in the government structure. Soviet networks were 
reactivated and old patterns of bureaucratic procedures seem to have been re-
established. Chapter 4.3 analyzes this issue in more detail. 
The Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2004 
indicates Georgia as one of the most corrupt states in the world. It ranks 133rd 
together with the Democratic Republic Congo, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and 
others. Only seven countries are seen as more corrupt than Georgia. A World 
Bank cross-country comparison of governance indicators in 2002 presents similar 
results. Using a data set of 199 countries and a ranking between 0 (worst results) 
and 1, Georgia ranks between 0.2 and 0.3 concerning its government effectiveness 
and regulatory quality. In terms of the rule of law and control of corruption the 
results are worse (about 0.1). Only “voice” and accountability measured higher 
(0.4) whereas political stability and absence of violence range lower than 0.05 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi 2003: 53 – 55). In another empirical assessment of 
20 transition economies conducted by the World Bank in 1999, firms were 
questioned about their business environment. In the case of Georgia the respon-
dents picked corruption along with inflation and taxes and regulations as the major 
institutional obstacles (Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann, Schankerman 2000: 19). 
Consequently, curbing corruption is one of the government’s highest priority 
objectives as declared at a “Compact to Promote Transparency and Combat 
Corruption” by the G8 states and Georgia, and at a donors’ conference held in 
Brussels in June 2004. Concrete measures mentioned in those documents are 
being discussed with respect to this chapter’s findings in chapter 5. Next, 
Georgia’s higher education system will be introduced.  
Education always enjoyed high prestige in Georgia. After gaining 
independence from Russia in 1918 a national university was established the same 
year. During the Soviet period, Georgia had the highest share of the population 
with a university degree among the republics of the Soviet Union. After its 
collapse, Georgia’s higher education system faced a tremendous reduction in its 
budget.36 Nevertheless, new state and especially private institutions of higher 
                                                 
35  He was Soviet foreign minister from 1985 to 1990. 
36  The share of education expenditures out of the total state budget decreased from estimated 24 % 
in 1991 to 3.3 % in 2002, whereas OECD countries spend 14 % of their budgets on education. 
The share of expenditures on higher education of total education spending remained almost 
constant. Total spending on education in Georgia is one of the lowest in the  Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) region (Eurasia Foundation 2003: 15 f.). 
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education have been established since then. According to the Department of 
Statistics, Georgia’s higher education system comprised 26 public education 
bodies, including universities, institutes and cultural academies, and 159 private 
bodies in 1997/98 (Eurasia Foundation 2003). The Ministry of Education even 
names 214 private bodies in 2000 (Sharvashidze 2002: 5). A huge array of new 
bodies in the education sector started operating particularly at the beginning of the 
1990’s as the accreditation procedure was still unregulated and almost no license 
was refused by the Ministry of Education. Decisions were made without study 
programs having been subject to independent review. Complaints about this 
practice prompted the Ministry to stop issuing licenses in 1996 (Eurasia 
Foundation 2003) and to set up an accreditation council responsible for organizing 
the procedure, producing corresponding directions and analyzing its results. Up to 
2003, the accreditation procedure has not changed, and the Ministry of Education 
continues to issue licenses for the establishment of new universities (Georgian 
Young Lawyers’ Association 2003: 12 f.). 
A similar picture of the misuse of power appears when examining the budget 
of the Ministry of Education. A survey on expenditures in 2001 carried out by 
Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA) and the Georgian Young 
Economists’ Association (GYEA) and supported by Transparency International – 
Georgia finds evidence for misuse of public funds by the Ministry. According to 
the report (GYLA et al. 2002)37, “2.7 million GEL (Georgian Lari)38 … are 
moving around in the accounts of commercial banks with ignorance of the 
treasury service”. “Neither the Ministry nor Chamber of Control exercise control 
…”. In particular, the number of students admitted into state higher education 
bodies “always exceeds the number determined by [the] state”, in 2000/2001 by 
2,846 students. Those students are added to the payment-sector and are a source 
for supplementary funds. Furthermore, the law of tender was violated when 
purchasing services from private businesses, and regulations on accounting were 
completely disregarded. Not only were large-scale purchases (of food) made 
through cash transaction, corresponding documents were also identified as fakes 
where, for example, names of persons who issued the document did not 
correspond with the stamp.  
The Ministry of Education and Science, together with the Ministries of Finance 
and Economy, and the Office of the State Chancellor manage the Georgian higher 
education system at a national level. The president appoints the rectors of public 
                                                 
37  There are no page numbers included in the report. Thus, sources of quotations are not stated 
correctly.  
38  1 GEL = 0.55 USD (January 12, 2005) 
http://www.bloomberg.com/analysis/calculators/currency.html 
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universities who together comprise the Council of Rectors which serves as an 
advisory board to the president and relevant ministries. This Council’s recom-
menddations carry great weight, and its members enjoy enormous public status. 
The universities themselves enjoy great autonomy in their decisions on personal 
and budget. Rectors of private universities are mostly appointed by their owners or 
founders.  
In figure 1, the principal is presented by the university’s top leadership who 
seeks to control its agents in the position of professors and instructors (teaching 
staff). Clients are students or their parents, respectively who seek to obtain the 
public good education and therefore contact one of the agents.  
Moving to the Ministry’s subordinated bodies it can be stated that the most 
important education providers are located in Tbilisi. Remarkably, four public 
universities (Ivane Javakhishvili Tblisi State University (TSU), Georgian 
Technical University (GTU), Georgian Agricultural University (GAU), and Tbilisi 
State Medical University) account for 75 % of total employment in higher 
education (Lorentzen 2000: 8). Universities enjoy full autonomy in terms of 
personnel decisions and internal resource allocation. The result is an overstaffed 
system due to universities’ reluctance to retire or layoff staff. The average age of 
professors in the TSU is 64 years, for example (interview 28). 
Private education bodies include Georgian and internationally funded 
universities. Their quality varies from highly competitive institutions to those 
“doing little more than selling diplomas” (Sharvashidze 2002: 16). International 
providers like the International Black Sea University (IBSU), the European School 
of Management (ESM), the Georgian Institute of Public Affairs (GIPA) and the 
Caucasus Business School (CBS) enjoy very good reputations. Almost 30,000 
students enter higher education bodies every year (Rostiashvili 2004: 27). 
Comparing state and private education bodies it can be stated that both enjoy 
annual growth rates of students’ enrollment (Sharshavidze 2002: 16, Eurasia 
Foundation 2003: 9 ff.). The Anglo-Saxon model of education was introduced in 
1996. Thus, bachelor’s and master’s degrees can be obtained at private as well as 
state universities. Although four-year undergraduate and two-year graduate studies 
have formally been set up university officials and employers suggest that the new 
models only “split the previous five year program without adapting contents …” 
(Eurasia Foundation 2003: 5). Since the introduction of a fee-paying sector at state 
universities in 1993 students at private as well as public education bodies pay 
tuition fees. Most popular, private universities increase their fees from year to 
year. Despite the competition among universities, the quality of teaching differs to 
a high degree. International universities in particular employ highly qualified 
teaching staff and apply modern methods of learning. While teaching is badly 
organized at state universities and other private bodies, lecturers are often poorly 
motivated or did not gain their position due to their knowledge and qualification.  
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Figure 1: The Principal-Agent-Client (PAC) relationship within the Higher 
Education System in Georgia 
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Insufficient teaching quality leads to inadequately qualified diploma holders 
from state universities. Out of all graduates of the GTU, for example, only 3 % to 
4 % are able to find a job immediately upon graduation while this figure amounts 
to 86 % at the four prestigious international universities mentioned above 
(Sharvashidze 2002: 16). Despite the large differences in the way universities 
operate, there is a close interdependence between private and state education 
bodies. Many private institutes rent state facilities and depend on part-time service 
of the academic staff of the state universities. On the other hand, badly paid 
teaching staff at state universities depend on private institutes as a source of 
supplementary income.  
At present, a team of specialists from the World Bank, the Georgian Ministry 
of Education and Science and other experts is working on a reform plan for the 
higher education system. The entrance procedure, in particular, will be redesigned. 
According to Nodar Ebanoidze, Deputy Head of the Department Social Sector of 
the Chamber of Control, entrance exams will have to be written in 12 centers at 
the same time on one day to ensure fair conditions (interview 11). Furthermore, 
every paper will be double-checked by two different assistants, and cameras will 
transmit the procedure outside (interview 27). The reform’s implementation is 
programmed to start in summer 2005.  
To summarize, the Georgian higher education system is to a high degree 
centralized, and its structure is rather diverse. Conditions favorable for corrupt 
practice dominate positive trends. The next section examines the potential for 
corruption at the Georgian higher education system more closely on the basis of a 
case study at TSU. 
Empirical findings 
Generally, practices at universities appear to be discussed broadly in public. It is 
assumed that this is due to the importance of education, in general, and the need to 
find the “right” person to bribe, in particular.  
The extent of corruption is seen as the highest at the “White Temple” as TSU is 
called39 but varies among its faculties. Faculties regarded as very prestigious like 
International Law, Economics, Political Sciences and Western Languages are 
perceived as most corrupt by experts, teaching staff and students (interviews 1, 5, 
12 and others). In contrast, students denied that corruption existing in faculties like 
Psychology or Greek (interviews 5, 12, 18, 21).  
                                                 
39  Its Rector Roin Metreveli is country-wide known as one of the most corrupt officials within the 
HES. He resigned on October 1, 2004 after a wave of corruption charges surfaced from a faction 
of students and after receiving pressure from the government (civil.ge, Dec 13, 2004). 
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The following section provides a rather descriptive overview of fields of 
corruption existent at TSU’s departments of Political Sciences, Law, and Western 
Languages before analyzing causes of corrupt practice in section 4.3.2. 
 
 
 
 
Picture: The “White Temple”: TSU’s first building40
 
 
Fields of corruption at the TSU’s most prestigious departments 
As explained above, the survey concentrated on administrative corruption at TSU. 
Four fields of corruption are concentrated on: tuition as preparation for entrance 
exams, entrance exams themselves, provision of books, and midterm and final 
exams (see figure 2). The recruitment of teaching staff was described as a corrupt 
field as well but, as it is not located at an agent-client but principal-agent level, it 
is not chosen as a case but rather will be discussed as an issue influencing the 
other four fields.  
Tuition 
To enter universities students generally have to pass three to four exams: Georgian 
language, a foreign language, and one or to others depending on the subject the 
                                                 
40  Source: TSU homepage 
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applicant wants to study. TSU students frequently stated that entrance exams, in 
Georgian language in particular, are designed in a way nobody could pass them 
without being prepared in private lessons in advance (interview 22, 23, 30). Three 
first year students of the Political Science department said that they did not know 
anybody who was student now and had not taken private lessons before the 
entrance exams (interview 30) which usually last for one year. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that “[p]reparation for entrance exams is one of the most profitable 
businesses in Georgia” but also “a basic source of corruption” (Rostiashvili 2004: 
27). Tuition is not supposed to improve students’ knowledge but to ensure they 
pass the entrance exams. That is why tutors are not chosen for their high 
qualifications but parents seek to have their children “prepared” by those 
professors or lecturers who are very likely to be members of the Admission 
Committee, and thus directly in a position to decide on which of the applicants 
will be admitted.  
According to the expert respondents, tuition fees are well known and non-
negotiable (interview 28, Rostiashvili 2004). 5th year Political Science students of 
TSU mentioned prices between 400 and 600 USD for one subject (interviews 33, 
34). If the tutor is the dean of the faculty he is able to charge higher prices as his 
membership in the Admission Committee is guaranteed. He or she usually has 10 
to 15 students in one tuition class, and 50 to 60 per year in total. To summarize, 
approximately 65 million USD are extracted for the tuition classes every year 
(Rostiashvili 2004: 27). 
 
Figure 2: Fields of corruption at TSU 
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Due to the fact that applicants do not become members of the students’ 
community because of their merits but their parents’ possibility and willingness to 
spend financial resources on their children’s higher education, they remain 
dependent on their tutor for the term studying at their desired faculty, as will be 
shown later on. 
Entrance exams 
Entrance exams take place once a year in August. While “fees” during the 
preparation period were paid to the teaching staff at department level, the entrance 
procedure’s revenues are mostly transferred to the top leadership of the university. 
Fees are either paid in GEL (Georgian Lari ) or USD but a certain “Green Shota” 
is known for accepting (green) USD notes, only (interview 28). No direct 
payments are made but middlemen are involved to fulfill this transfer (interview 
27). It is supposed that a share of the payments goes into their pockets (interviews 
27, 28).  
As only a payment to the university’s leadership ensures 100 % certainty of 
admission, paying for tuition can be interpreted as a way of establishing and 
maintaining good contacts with persons regarded as important and influential 
within the university structure. Most tuition students pay additionally at the 
entrance procedure. According to Rostiashvili, parents were recommended to 
chose another faculty for their child as “all the admission vacancies had already 
been ‘sold’” which led her to conclude that “budgets of the families compete, not 
the students[‘s knowledge]” (Rostiashvili 2004: 28).  
The size of bribes paid during the entrance procedure varies among universities 
but also among faculties, and they are higher the more prestigious the university or 
the faculty is. Entrance to the Law faculty is thought to cost the most. Payments as 
high as 20,000 USD were mentioned in my interviews (interview 25, 33). 
According to Rostiashvili, prices have fallen due to competition from the new 
state Technical University (Rostiashvili 2004: 28). Bribes for entering Political 
Science are lower and range around 5,000 USD (interview 34). The same price 
was given for entrance to the faculty of Western Languages by a previous 
graduate (interview 12).41 It was mentioned by students that families with more 
than one child studying at TSU were offered reductions (interview 30). 
                                                 
41  Taking into consideration that the annual fees for the non-budgetary (paid) sector of TSU account 
for 600 USD (International Law, International Relations, and German Language and Literature) 
or 700 USD (English Languages and Literature, and International Business) (see TSU homepage), 
for example, the bribe sums seem unreasonably high. Still, parents choose to pay this bribes for 
having their children enter the public sector with the same classes and certificates for prestige 
reasons. 
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As depicted in table 4 the likelihood of students to be admitted to a university 
hardly depends on their level of knowledge42 but rather whether or not a payment 
is made to the university’s top leadership, and the size of these payments 
influences the decisions by the Admission Committee. Even ignorant non-tuition 
students but also ignorant tuition students face no problems in “passing” the 
entrance exams if a reasonable sum was paid to the university’s top leadership. 
Qualified applicants not having attended tuition classes and not having paid the 
university’s top leadership have little chance of being accepted as future students 
(interviews 23, 25). One TSU student mentioned a case where one applicant, 
known as one of the brightest at High School, received far lower grades at the 
entrance procedure than his former schoolmates. Only transferring a certain sum 
to a, to my interview partner, unknown person ensured his admission as a TSU 
student (interview 23). On the other hand, cases are known where children of 
popular and wealthy families were not admitted to university. It is assumed that 
these pseudo cases were “arranged” to rebut reproaches on corruption (interview 
27). 
Although this money from the entrance procedure mainly flows to the 
university’s leadership the departments are aware of who “purchased” the 100 % 
guarantee for being admitted. A few examples will demonstrate how the 
Admission Committee “enforces the informal contracts”.  
Most of my student interview partners were aware of the mechanisms by which 
the Admission Committee used to distinguish the “good” from the “bad” exam 
papers. Tuition students, for example, were told to mark their papers with a little 
dot at one corner or in the middle of the left margin of every sheet of paper 
(interviews 25, 27, 33, 34). From a reliable source I was told that the members of 
the Admission Committee who usually have known each other for decades would 
sit together after the exams to distribute the exam papers in correspondence with 
their marks to ensure each member has got his or her students through the exam.  
According to Rostiashvili, applicants whose parents paid bribes, were on 
another “list” from the non-bribers. Divided by this list, applicants entered 
different rooms to fill in their exam forms. There was no supervisor in the 
“bribers’ room” but prepared answers which only had to be rewritten.  
 
                                                 
42  Well prepared students are only slightly more likely to be admitted than non-prepared students 
when no bribe was paid neither to the university’s top leadership nor to the department’s 
leadership (see table 4, column 4). 
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Table 4: Likelihood of a successful admission to the TSU’s prestigious departments 
Paying to TSU’s top leadership before the entrance 
procedure 
Yes No 
Paying tuition fee to the 
department 
Paying tuition fee to the 
department 
 
Yes 
(1) 
No 
(2) 
Yes 
(3) 
No 
(4) 
Seriously 
prepared 
student 
Admission 
guaranteed 
Admission 
guaranteed if 
higher 
payment to 
TSU’s top 
leadership 
than column 
1 
Admission 
not 
guaranteed 
but possible 
Admission 
very unlikely 
 
Ignorant 
student 
Admission 
guaranteed 
Admission 
guaranteed if 
higher 
payment to 
TSU’s top 
leadership 
than column 
1 
Admission 
not 
guaranteed 
but possible 
Admission 
very unlikely 
 
 
Source: Results from the empirical findings 
As seen from the cases described above, tuition is a lucrative business for the 
privileged staff of the departments, and the entrance procedure enables the 
university’s top leadership to “earn” significant “income”. Rostiashvili estimates 
the total sum transferred during the entrance procedure as high as 50 million USD 
(Rostiashvili 2004: 28). 
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Provision of books 
Another way teaching staff extracts money from students or their parents is by 
selling their books. As exams are usually designed to make students repeat the 
facts they have been told during classes instead of applying their knowledge, 
students are well advised to purchase these books. Professors usually demand 
prices which are higher than a copy would normally cost but, as professors make 
notes about who bought a book and who did not, students would rather pay more 
than risk damaging the relationship to their professors (interview 20). The latter 
tend to ask their students at the end of the semester to donate their books to the 
department’s library in order to sell them again to next year’s students. 
Midterm and final exams 
As already mentioned once students enter a university by means of bribing the 
Admission Committee they will depend throughout the duration of their studies on 
the good will of their professor. Although it is known that good grades can be 
purchased at a university and despite the fact that serious students are respected, 
diploma and midterm transcripts count more in the Georgian society than 
knowledge (interviews 1, 5, 14, 28). Students, therefore, pay money to receive 
good grades. Prices for shifting grades are known to the students and depend on 
the extent of change: Fifth year Political Science students stated that changing a 4 
(good) into a 5 (very good) at the midterm exams costs 50 USD while changing 
from 3 to 5 is more expensive (interview 12). At the faculty for Western 
Languages a final exam’s 5 costs 100 USD, and a 4 costs 70 USD (interview 12). 
Alcoholic drinks are also accepted as bribes during midterm and final exams 
(interviews 33, 34). 
Discussion of causes  
These fields are taken up in the following sections when discussing causes of 
corruption that have been examined theoretically in chapter 3. Correspondingly, 
this section is also divided into three categories: wages, personal and country 
characteristics (section 4.3.2.1), formal institutions (section 4.3.2.2), and informal 
institutions (section 4.3.2.3). Information on the first section originates from 
country- and sector-specific publications. For the remaining section the results 
from the interviews deliver additional, very useful insights. 
Determining framework: wages, personal and country characteristics 
It is undisputed that the wage level of the teaching staff at TSU is unrealistically 
low. The average level ranges between 48 and 86 GEL depending on the states of 
the professor or constructor. An ordinary professor without any leadership 
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position earns about 276 GEL. The teaching staff of TSU enjoy special benefits 
from the government under the Shevardnadze regime. Due to a 50 % salary 
increase the average rate there ranges from 73 to 120 GEL (Rostiashivili 2004: 
25). Taking into account an average subsistence minimum of 125.4 GEL in 2002 
(Statistical Yearbook of Georgia 2003) the legal salary does not provide a 
sufficient base to survive. No reliable statements can be made concerning the fact, 
whether teaching staff aims to maximize its income (shirking model) or aims to 
receive fair wages and thus, the question, if an increase in teaching staff’s wages 
would reduce corruption, cannot be answered. Generally, experts agree that an 
increase in wages is necessary but not sufficient (Lorentzen 2000: 13, Glonti: e-
mail, Dec 29, 2004). Additionally, it was mentioned that raising wage levels might 
reduce the number of students/parents being able to effort wage-competitive 
bribes on one hand but might also increase the amount per bribe on the other.  
With regard to personal characteristics no evidence was found concerning 
gender and wealth aspects nor on the issue of how educated agents and clients are.  
The picture is more diverse when applying Della Porta and Pizzorno’s 
approach to an individual’s relationship to his or her reference group. Their 
findings suggeste that participation in corrupt deals is more likely if a person has a 
low status within a reference group, if he or she is a newcomer, if the group’s 
values are less homologous, or if an exit option is less distressing. Taking into 
account the most profitable fields of tuition and entrance exams it was shown that 
first, the members of the Admission Committee enjoy a very high status within the 
university and even within the higher education system. According to an expert, 
engaged for an international organization but also teaching staff, newcomers have 
almost no chance to become a member of this highly privileged circle (interview 
28). As the great majority is involved in corruption, good governance is valued 
homogenously low among the group members. “Exit” from being a privileged 
member of the university staff is undisputedly a great disadvantage as access to 
job positions to extract bribes of this level is rather rare. Thus, despite the high 
pervasiveness of corruption none of the personal characteristics is common among 
university officials highly engaged in corruption.  
Georgia’s country characteristics, in contrast, totally correspond to what is 
assumed favorable for corruption discussed in chapter 3. First, police forces in 
Georgia enjoy great power, in particular compared to the military forces. Although 
a recent reform has reduced the size of personal, the financial resources remain 
relatively high and the standard of equipment has been improved. Second, Georgia 
under Shevardnadze was known for being governed by oligarchs. The Council of 
Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly described the country as “slipping towards the 
autocratic exercise of power by an oligarchy, against the background of nepotism 
and widespread and endemic corruption at every level of both government and 
society” (Parliamentary Assembly 2004). Economy and politics were closely 
intertwined. Shevardnadze’s closest family members owned the most powerful 
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companies in the country. Recent arrests, like of Shevardnadze’s son-in-law who 
was head of Georgia’s biggest mobile phone company Magti (Central Asia 
Caucasus Analyst, Feb 20, 2004), intend to break the oligarch structure. Third, the 
Georgian society is homogenous. Georgians represent the majority of the 
population with 70.1 %. The largest minorities are Armenians (8.1 %), Russians 
(6.3 %), and Azeris (5.7 %) (CIA World Factbook 2004). 
Fourth, Georgia’s transition to democracy went off in a changeable way. The 
establishment of democratic structures was interrupted by civil wars in Tbilisi, 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the first years after the collapse of the former 
Soviet Union. The conflicts in the latter regions are not yet resolved. Fifth, the 
Georgian state is highly centralized except for the de facto independent region of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The president appoints the gamgebelis who elect and 
head the local councils (sakrebulos). Mayors are generally elected but the mayors 
of Tbilisi and Poti are appointed by the president. Last, due to its geopolitical 
relevant position Georgia has become an addressee of large sums of international 
aid. The US direct the largest sums into the country, and German Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has given Georgia the status of a 
Schwerpunktland for German development aid. 
Formal institutions 
As in chapter 3, formal institutions are examined in three sections: legislation, 
relationships of actors of the PAC structure and control bodies.  
Legislation is relevant on two levels: General anti-corruption law, and law on 
education. George Papuashvili gives an overview on what has been achieved so 
far in terms of general anti-corruption legislation in Georgia. An Interim 
Parliamentary Anti-Corruption Commission was set up in 1996 in order to 
establish and facilitate methods in fighting against corruption. One year later, the 
Parliament adopted the Law on the Conflict of Interests and Corruption in Public 
Service. The law aims to increase transparency as officials are obliged to declare 
their property and financial state to the State Taxation Agency. Additionally, the 
law restricts private entrepreneurship of officials. A public servant shall not act as 
permanent manager or be a member of a control or an advisory body. The law also 
forbids holding any other position at the treasury agency or the legislative body 
simultaneously. Despite several amendments the law provides a strong legislative 
base to prevent corruption. In reality however, it has not yet been systematically 
enforced. 
The “Law of Georgia about Education” adopted in 1997 was criticized 
fundamentally by education experts as it supported and perpetuated the old 
management system and the direct power of the president over the education 
system who approved the rectors of the public universities. Therefore a new draft 
was prepared by leading education specialists of Georgia with support of the Open 
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Society Foundation Georgia in 2002. The main amendments consisted of the 
restriction of the powers of the president and the introduction of a new system of 
entrance examinations. Nevertheless, it lacked incentives for decentralization 
within the education system. In summer 2004, a new version of the above 
mentioned draft was prepared by the Consulting Board of the Ministry of 
Education and Science (see Rostiashvili 2004: 16). Meanwhile, the recent draft 
has been adopted. Most revolutionary of all, the power is decentralized. The 
rectors will be elected for a two-year term instead of being appointed by the 
president. The competences of the Academic Board as the highest representative 
organ of academics and the Senate as the highest organ of students and professors 
are clearly divided. Furthermore the departments received more administrative and 
financial power. A staff rotation principle is supposed to improve the university’s 
management. According to Rostiashvili, a disadvantage is identified in the fact 
that the Minister of Education and Science is entitled to dismiss the Senate if it 
fails consecutively twice to receive institutional accreditation.  
Georgian anti-corruption law as well as its law on education, according to ex-
perts, has been enormously improved and created a legislative framework which is 
more lucid and transparent and capable of reducing if not eradicating corruption.  
Beginning with the vertical agent-client relationship between professors and 
university administration, on one hand, and students (and parents, respectively), 
on the other, Olson’s model of the “stationary bandit” best describes the way the 
university staff “governs” the students. As outlined in chapter 4.3.2.1 the 
relationship is established to last at least for the time the student is enrolled at the 
university. Once parents had paid a bribe for their child’s admission the professor 
expected the student to be “loyal” for the time studying. As experts as well as 
students confirmed only very few students were given best grades at midterm and 
final exams to provide incentives “for bribing the grade up”. Thus, professors, like 
stationary bandits, enable their subordinates to make use of a public good but also 
extract shares of what the subordinates gained from consuming this public good. 
In our case, the students are provided with education in order to receive a diploma 
which again increases their future income opportunities. To summarize, the 
relationship between professor and student is determined by the professor’s long 
term object to maximize his or her illegal income while the student aims to receive 
a satisfactory diploma. According to Olson, a “roving bandit” who acts to 
maximize his one run income and then move further has incentives to settle to 
become a stationary bandit. The latter constellation compared to the roving model 
is considered as more stable as both parties get what they require in the long term.  
The same conclusion can be deduced when applying Shleifer and Vishny’s 
model of corruption “without theft”. Obviously, there is no official price for 
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admission to the budgetary (non-paying) sector.43 Thus, the money transferred 
illegally does not reduce the state budget (corruption without theft). The bribe for 
admission to this prestigious sector is in any case lower than official fees at the 
high profile international universities mentioned in chapter 4.2. Thus, professors 
win by earning extra money and students win by being admitted to the university’s 
prestigious budgetary sector as most would not be able to afford the fees at the 
private universities.  
Applying the models of “stationary bandits” and “corruption without theft” as 
discussed above shows that corruption is persistent as the agents and the clients 
win. Next, the relationship among the agents is investigated. 
The agents consist of the university’s administration, the professors and so 
called middlemen who usually are lecturers. As described in chapter 4.3.1 pro-
fessor receive the largest bribes during the tuition session while the university’s 
administration earns its share during the entrance procedure. Middlemen act 
between the clients and professors or the top administration. The relationship at 
this level was most difficult to examine but seems very relevant.  
Critical publications and interviews with young education staff indicate that 
especially aged “red professors” know each other for decades as they belonged to 
the Soviet elite. An expert described three examples that indicate that these 
professors, often members of the Admission Committee, often cooperate. First, as 
mentioned above the professors meet after the entrance exams to divide the papers 
among each other so every one receives “his” students. Second, these aged 
professors become members of the Admission Committee almost automatically. 
For reasons of respect in front of their elders, younger lecturers would not even 
apply for this position. Third, a professor who already accepted an above-average 
number of students for tuition would “forward” other interested students to his or 
her colleagues. These facts suggest that the circle of aged professors present an 
insider group with mutual support for each other and further that they prevent 
newcomers from becoming part of this group.  
The division of tuition classes as a source of bribes for professors and the 
entrance exams as a source for the top university’s administration also suggests 
that agents cooperate to maximize the total amount of bribes instead of acting 
independently. According to Rostiashvili as mentioned above, professors are well 
informed about which students have paid off the university’s top administrators to 
ensure a 100 % chance of admission. 
Additionally, middlemen are amongst the agents. As assumed by Rostiashvili 
and also stated by experts these middlemen, while transferring illegal money to 
                                                 
43  Admission to the state university’s non-budgetary (paid) sector is not comparable prestigious as it 
is known for its admission not based on merit.  
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professors or to the university’s top administration, keep back a share for 
themselves. This makes them part of the network. It allows middlemen to extract 
their own shares and the recipients of the bribe to stay anonymous.  
As seen above, the agents on one hand cooperate with each other but also are in 
a position to easily prevent others from becoming involved. It was confirmed by a 
number of experts that the annual formation of the Admission Committee is 
neither competitive nor fair. Applying Shleifer and Vishny’s model the level of 
agents acts as a joint monopoly which is known from chapter 3 as the one that 
collects the highest total sum of bribes and thus causes the largest socio-economic 
harm to society.  
Finally, as already mentioned in the description of the entrance procedure, the 
university’s top leadership enjoys great overall power. Professors intending to 
work honestly are even likely to be intimidated by the top leadership.  
Formal bodies established to control the administrative procedures within the 
university are either formal without consequences or the bodies themselves are too 
weak to enforce any penalties. 
The Ministry of Education is supposed to facilitate the activities of the 
universities but it was itself “the focus of numerous complaints of negligence by 
the public sector, civil society and international organizations” (Rostiashvili 2004: 
18). Complaints refer to misuse and embezzlement of public funds, serious 
financial mismanagement and lack of professionalism in Ministry programs. 
Although numerous violations of the law could be proved, “corrupt officials were 
never punished” (Rostiashvili 2004: 19). 
The Chamber of Control is the official body for auditing the financial situation 
of state organizations. It is directly subordinate to Parliament. Although its 
material is very valuable and staff are to a certain extent very motivated, it is 
operating unprofessionally. The data collected is difficult to access and the reports 
present only very general conclusions. Although various violations of the law have 
been documented and presented, no organization has ever been punished. Thus, 
the Chamber of Control is not able to conduct its auditing independently and/or it 
is unwilling to change the situation in state bodies.  
There also exists a students’ organizations within universities to receive 
complaints and fight corruption. According to students’ opinions during the 
interview these bodies also have a rather formal character. They are supported by 
the universities’ administrations and students active in this body are described as 
those with the strongest personal connections with the universities’ administration. 
Rostiashvili additionally found out about party financed students’ organizations. 
Their activities lack continuity as members having been active got grants to study 
abroad and then often split from the group. The Kmara! movement, known for its 
activities during the “Rose Revolution” is seen as independent but lacking in 
power.  
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Not only formal auditing bodies document and make corrupt practice public. 
The media is also actively engaged.44 Generally, corrupt practice in the Georgian 
higher education system and persons involved in these violations of laws are well 
known in the society and in powerful governmental bodies. What is lacking is not 
information but the will of the political leadership to punish honored professors.  
Informal institutions 
Chapter 3 discussed legal culture and religion as pre-Soviet originating factors 
determining the level of corruption. Additionally, historical causes are often 
mentioned when reading about the roots of corruption. Georgia spent many years 
of its history fighting invaders: the ancient Greeks, the Romans, the Byzantines, 
the Mongols, the Persians, and the Ottomans. The last pre-Soviet intention to build 
up a Georgian state failed in 1921 when the Bolsheviks invaded the republic 
which had declared its independence in 1918. Respondents of the interviews by 
Rostiashvili gave the absence of Georgian statehood for centuries as one reason 
for current large scale corruption. As the state building process was interrupted by 
several invasions and citizens did not properly understand how a state was 
supposed to function “[s]tealing from the state was regarded as stealing from 
invaders, and not from them selves” (Rostiashvili 2004: 69).  
Georgian legal culture is influenced by Persian rule which, in contrast to 
British rule, concentrated rather more on hierarchies and authority than on 
procedure. Additionally, Persian law was based on unpaid civil servants. Their 
position was seen as a means of raising income from the population.45 Concerning 
religion, Orthodox Christianity, the religion of the majority of Georgia’s 
population, focuses on loyalty to family members instead of loyalty to office and 
thus creates opportunities for nepotism and corruption.  
Many experts have emphasized that the Soviet legacy has shaped informal 
institutions in Georgia to a high degree. As mentioned above, the state apparatus 
built up by the imperial power was partly perceived inadequate for Georgian 
society. Alexandre Kukhianidze, Director of the American University’s 
Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) Georgia Office, describes 
the perception of Moscow’s domination by Georgians the following way: 
“Feelings of alienation toward statehood were overshadowed by the insecurity of a 
proud … nation” (Kukhianidze 2003: 1). Rapidly growing corruption, embezzle-
                                                 
44  The independent television channel Rustavi 2 has produced a number of segments of its program 
„60 Minutes“ on corruption in different academic bodies, including TSU. As a result, the head of 
the program and a lecturer at TSU were dismissed from their positions (Rostiashvili 2004: 20).  
45  This statement is the opinion of some respondents of empirical research conducted by 
Rostiashvili in 2003.  
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ment, and underground entrepreneurial activities from the beginning of the 1960s 
were signs of increasing ignorance of the Soviet rule. The local party elites and so-
called “red directors” of state enterprises were predominantly involved. 
Corruption was seen by them as a means of independence from Moscow which 
was “perceived … as a ‘cash cow’ for ‘milking’ billions of rubles” (Kukhianidze 
2003: 1). Corrupt practice was latent under Stalin but became more and more open 
and pervasive. Despite several convictions by the then First Secretary of the 
Communistic Party of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia Eduard 
Shevardnadze in the 1970s, the so called “negative phenomenon” remained and 
had developed into an “administrative market” (Kordonskij 2000) in the 1980s.  
Besides a pervasive violation of Soviet administrative law, most Georgians 
were also reluctant to follow the Soviet ideology-based form of collective social 
life. Thus, Georgians focused even more on their traditional forms of relationship 
that favor relatives, friends or neighbors – which again can provide a basis for 
nepotism and corruption. 
Academic research and teaching during the Soviet period was exclusive. Only 
those academics loyal to the Communist Party who were well informed about 
Marxist-Leninist ideology were able to survive at the education system (interview 
28) as secret agents of the Bolshevists and later of the Communist Party 
penetrated the higher education system to control research and lecture. Thus, it 
was not qualifications and intelligence or a critical mind that was required to 
become a professor but rather more contacts to the local Communist elite and 
membership of the Communist Party. These “red professors”, now aged 65 years 
or older, still dominate the prestigious universities. Students’ parents seek them 
out to have their children “prepared” for the entrance exams. Young, idealistic and 
qualified teaching staff still accept them as members of the Admission Committee 
due to the social norms of respect towards elders. None of the Soviet-style 
professors is dismissed from his or her46 position because of the traditional respect 
for elders (interview 28). Their direct contact to the country’s leadership ensures 
their enormous power and safeguards their employment.  
In post-Soviet Georgia corruption is still perceived as pervasive. A recent study 
of public opinion on organized crime and corruption by the American University’s 
Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) Georgia Office 
demonstrated that 84.1 % of respondents believe that officials at the highest 
government level are engaged in corruption – a further 83.2 % believes the same 
to be true of officials of lower government levels (Godziashvili). Unfortunately, as 
high perceived corruption can also encourage it, as incentives are set to 
                                                 
46  Although female professors exist the field of higher education’s top leadership is without doubt a 
male domain. 
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participate. Nevertheless, honest university staff can be found and not only 
amongst the younger generation. The sociologist Natela Donadze has been 
teaching at TSU since 1964 and is known for refusing bribes. She is quoted as 
saying “I have my principles, and my main principle is the knowledge of students, 
and knowledge in general” (MacWilliams 2002). Within universities she is clearly 
an exception.  
According to Barbara Christophe, corrupt structures in present-day Georgia are 
an intended product developed by the acting elite in order to performance state-
building in a cost-efficient way (Christophe 2003: 8). State officials are encou-
raged to participate in corrupt deals and a combined strategy of surveillance and 
blackmailing secures their obedience. Thus, corruption appears to her as an overall 
conception of state performance – and not as often stated as a temporary deficit 
within the transition process.  
A pyramid-like system certainly exists within the structure of TSU. 
Rostiashvili refers to the rector as “the main ‘architect’” (Rostiashvili 2004: 29) of 
this system and its well organized criminal network. “Red professors” are very 
likely to become members of the Admission Committee, young lecturers are 
frequently middlemen for transferring bribes. The Council of Rectors as highest 
body of all universities has direct contact to the president. What role the Ministry 
of Education plays within this structure cannot be stated, as this level (of political 
corruption) was not the focus of my study. Therefore, no conclusions can be made 
about any surveillance or blackmailing by high level officials in order to ensure 
the subordinates obey.  
Concerning organized crime in the form of “Gewaltunternehmer” it is 
confirmed by certain sources that organized crime takes place and has certainly 
not decreased after small weapons were distributed during the civil wars in 
Georgia at the beginning of the 1990s. Nevertheless, nothing can be stated about 
the impact of organized crime on corruption at the Georgian higher education 
system.  
Interim results  
The paper examined corruption at an administrative level at TSU. It was shown 
that corruption has a systematic character and exists during all phases of students’ 
stay at a university. The incredible hidden power, the leadership at TSU enjoys, 
results from its roots during the Soviet period where recruitment was based on 
loyalty to the Communist Party. This nomenclature network still exists and 
dominates the highly centralized internal structure of the entire education system. 
According to Rostiashvili, the topic of corruption at the Georgian higher education 
system is “most explosive and therefore [an] untouched zone in the society” 
(Rostiashvili 2004: 29).  
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When searching for causes a diverse picture appears. Appendix 2 summarizes 
the findings of this chapter.47 As discussed above no statements can be made 
about personal characteristics and how far they influence an individual’s 
disposition to participate in corrupt acts. Just as little can be said about the impact 
of a wage increase. What was shown is that the current wage level is below the 
subsistence minimum. Georgia’s country characteristic as a determining 
framework, including its legal culture and the norms set by the religion, provides 
unfavorable conditions for good governance. Its democratic history has been very 
short, a small oligarchy controls the political decision making as well as large-
scale entrepreneurial activities in the country and is backed by a loyal rather than 
an independent legislature. The society traditionally and in line with Orthodox 
Christianity focuses more on family ties than on commitments arising from one’s 
position. 
In contrast to widespread theoretical approaches and policy recommendations a 
lack of transparency and lucidity of regulations as a cause of corruption cannot be 
identified. On the one hand, it is well known to students and professors that any 
payments for entering a university are illegal, on the other, the size of bribes 
required for tuition, entrance to the desired faculty and certain grades at the exams 
are very transparent and non-negotiable. Equally the middlemen and the means to 
contact important persons are well known and easily accessible.  
Although the regulations on the entrance procedure to TSU certainly have their 
deficits, the “rules of the game” are clearly defined and accessible. After the 
adoption of the most recent draft the Law on Higher Education has also been 
improved in order to limit the opportunities to give or take bribes. The amend-
ments concerning the top level of the university’s leadership whose power has 
been enormously restricted and balanced are especially noteworthy. Thus formal 
institutions cannot be identified as the main factors favorable for corruption. 
According to the interview results, pervasive corruption at the Georgian higher 
education system mainly results from informal institutions established during the 
Soviet period. As loyalty to the Communist Party or connections to important 
families but not qualifications were required to be recruited to positions at 
universities, a certain exclusive network was established. Its members totally 
depend on this network as they have hardly any employment opportunities outside 
the university. That is why incentives to maintain strong relationships to the top 
government level were higher then incentives to perform research and teaching. 
Due to “red professors”’ noncompetitive positions on the free labor market they 
are forced to extract money from their position. Being aware of the high prestige 
                                                 
47  Appendix 2 should be understood as a tool to visualize the empirical findings. Classifications 
made in the second column are simplifying and show tendencies rather than facts. 
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of studying at the budgetary sector at Georgia’s first university the “red 
professors” have created an artificial price for the free public good “education at 
universities’ budgetary sector” in order to extract tremendous “fees”. As most 
students do not have alternatives and as corrupt behavior by university staff has 
never been subject of punishment, corruption has become systemic.  
Informal institutions of Soviet legacy like communist ideology and blat’ combi-
ned with the current problematic socio-economic and labor market situation 
determine the formal relationships of the actors of the PAC structure. Established 
due to the pattern of recruitment in the Soviet period and maintained in the form 
of the Admission Committee the agents (“red professors”) compose an almost 
exclusive “insiders club”. As the Admission Committee alone decides about who 
will be admitted to university and as access to the committee is limited to the 
“insiders club” its members enjoy a monopoly on power. As no single member has 
a real income alternative outside the university system all members depend on the 
loyalty of the others. Thus, the members the Admission Committee act as joint 
monopolists (Shleifer and Vishny 1993) and intend to maximize the committee’s 
profit. 
Concerning the vertical relationships of the PAC structure two categories have 
to be distinguished: the principal-agent and the agent-client relationship. The 
former is determined by a principal (university’s top leadership) who does not 
ignore corruption but who is even more interested in the flow of illegal finances, 
as a share48 is transferred up to the highest positions. As admission to the 
budgetary sector of universities is supposed to be free of charge and thus no 
money is supposed to be transferred to the state treasury, the principal and the 
agents are able to divide the total amount of bribes amongst themselves. Referring 
to Shleifer and Vishny (1993) the corrupt deal can be described as “corruption 
without theft”. The relationship between agents and clients can be compared to the 
one between principal and agents and can also be characterized as a win-win 
situation.49 It is stable in the long term as the prices set by the agents reflect the 
financial capacity of the clients. As Olson’s “stationary bandits” the corrupt 
professors have chosen a long time horizon to continuously extract money once 
the student has established a tuition relationship (see entrance procedure, 
provision of books, midterm and final exams).  
Informal institutions as well as the resulting horizontal and vertical relation-
ships between the principal, agents and clients have been established over a long 
period. As they are identified as the main causes of the endemic corruption at the 
                                                 
48  Its size extracted during the entrance exams is estimated to 90 % (Rostiashvili 2004: 29). 
49  The “losers” are qualified students who are not being admitted and cannot afford to pay them in. 
Additionally, they have no “voice” to complain.  
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Georgian higher education system, measures to curb corruption would have to 
consider these findings to be successful.  
5 Conclusions 
The aim of this survey was to examine corruption at the Georgian higher 
education system. As assumed the phenomenon occurs systemically at different 
levels of the education system and in various fields. The focus was the 
administrative level of TSU where university staff meets students and parents, 
respectively. The following section considers anti-corruption measures at the 
Georgian higher education system. Finally, there is a discussion on the extent of 
the applicability of these findings for general anti-corruption campaigns in post-
Soviet countries. 
Georgia’s Higher Education System and its perspectives 
The findings show that, in contrast to theoretical approaches and policy recom-
mendations, corruption at the Georgian higher education system does not result 
from a lack of transparency and lucidity of regulations. In fact, informal 
institutions originated during the Soviet period, and the resulting ideology-based 
patterns of recruitment to positions at the higher education system have a large 
impact on the current power structure within TSU. “Red professors” constitute the 
majority of the Council of Rectors who are directly subordinate to the president. 
Under Shevardnadze they enjoyed unrestricted backing. Due to their non-
competitive position in the labor market they entirely depend on the Georgian 
higher education system and, in particular, the opportunities to extract illegal 
finances. Rooted in the nomenclature network and being members of the Admis-
sion Committee, the “red professors” possess power over their students and 
applicants.  
As described above, they act as joint monopolists (Shleifer and Vishny 1993) 
during the tuition period, the entrance exam procedure, during midterm and final 
exams and as a source of required literature, and in this way maximize the sum of 
their bribes, which is estimated at 115 million USD annually. The regime change 
in January 2004 has not brought any improvement, yet. The university’s top 
leadership still enjoys support from high level officials in the government or from 
parliamentarians.  
What needs to be done?  
President Mikhail Saakashvili emphasized the importance of education for the 
future of Georgia at a meeting of previous participants of an American Council 
exchange program in Tbilisi on October 11, 2004 and promised a 100 % increase 
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in expenditure in this sector for the year 2005 (statement Lela Nanuashvili, 
October 12, 2004).  
Nevertheless, a higher budget does not solve the problem if the funds are 
misused. The recently developed anonymous entrance procedure, which was 
described in chapter 4.2, is certainly a step in the right direction. Nevertheless, 
external experts and students have doubts about its success. 5th year students of 
TSU believe that reforms have to start from outside the university, and incentives 
for education rather than for diplomas are required. On being asked about their 
expectations concerning the planned centralized procedure of entrance exams they 
stated that Georgians with good connections or a large budget will find their way 
to the circle of experts who are informed about the exams, regardless of how small 
this circle is.  
Lika Glonti, an education expert, is especially concerned about non-monetary 
and therefore barely detectable exchanges of favors (blat’). Even if transfers of 
money can be reduced by strong monitoring or laws on disclosure of accounts, 
blat’ – as often asynchronously occurring – will never be completely abolished. 
Nodar Ebanoidze, Deputy Head of the Department Social Sector of the Chamber 
of Control, also does not believe in pure amendments of laws and rules. In his 
opinion the whole mentality has to be changed.  
Before shifting to concrete measures to curb corruption at the Georgian higher 
education system, its causes have to be restated: the opportunity of “red 
professors” to act as joint monopolists, their backing at the top government level, 
and informal institutions regarding both, the recruitment procedure and the annual 
establishment of the Admission Committee. Obviously, the powerful union of “red 
professors” strongly hinders major reforms in the higher education system in 
Georgia. As supported by Alexandre Kukhianidze, for example, the senior 
generation of professors has “to leave university to give way to younger and better 
educated lecturers” (Kukhianidze: e-mail, Dec 30, 2004). Still, he warns about 
amateurism once experienced staff have left. In any event, socio-economically 
acceptable, financial compensations as well as reasonably tactful exit options have 
to be developed to ensure a respectable (early) retirement of unqualified staff.  
The replacement of the vacancies has to follow a merit-based and fair 
recruitment procedure. Qualifications concerning academic knowledge and 
teaching methods rather than nepotism or loyalty should be the criteria for 
appointment. Additionally, wages should be increased to a fair level to eliminate 
the low wage argument as a justification of corruption. Likewise, the 
establishment of the Admission Committee has to take place under competitive 
conditions. Its composition has to vary annually to avoid members establishing a 
joint monopoly position. 
To extend the view from the agent level up and down the PAC structure (figure 
1) the governmental leadership as well as potential university applicants have to 
be included in the analysis. The over-centralization was already criticized in 
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chapter 4. Fair competition for students and teaching staff can only be ensured if 
the university’s top leadership of the higher education system is also reformed. 
The Council of Rectors in particular should be deprived of power and replaced 
with reform orientated and competent academics. Taking into consideration 
attitudes and expectations about chances and means to enter a university, society 
has to become aware of reforms inside the university. Information campaigns have 
to be conducted to discourage bribery as common practice suggests.  
Before shifting to the broader context of general anti-corruption measures it 
should be mentioned that any phenomenon as complex and pervasive as 
corruption will not disappear in the short term but gradual improvements are 
needed as stimulus for future developments.  
General good governance policy 
The case of the TSU’s most prestigious departments only presents a part of the 
Georgian higher education system. Still, it is believed that corruption exists in all 
departments (Eduard Kodua, Chairman of Sociology department at TSU, quoted 
by MacWilliams 2002). Similarly, corruption exists in a number of public 
administration bodies in post-Soviet countries. I do not intend to apply my 
findings blindly to any other Georgian sector or any other country but I do believe 
that there are certain similarities. First, although the higher education system 
differs from other sectors of a country, some structures and mechanisms can be 
expected to be comparable. Generally, administrative corruption can occur where 
public goods are provided: a passport, a driving license, a permission to open a 
shop, or education, and the parties involved agree to participate in the corrupt deal. 
Second, the Soviet legacy is one of many factors shaping the institutional 
framework of all post-Soviet societies, and this influences the vertical and 
horizontal relationships between principals, agents and clients. Therefore, it is my 
opinion, that the results of this survey should be kept in mind when conducting 
background research for general anti-corruption policies in post-Soviet countries. 
As presented in the OECD’s Anti-Corruption Network’s “Regional Anti-
Corruption Action Plan for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, 
the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Ukraine” (January 2004 version), building 
agencies and amending laws are insufficient measures to reduce corruption. 
Reforms have to occur at the civil management level as well.  
Besides fair wages, merit-based recruitment and competition among officials 
has to be introduced in the public service sector. A credible commitment by the 
government’s leadership is needed, and society has to become aware of the 
ongoing reforms and their implications for the citizens. Saakashvili’s anti-
corruption slogan “Don’t take bribes and don’t give jobs to your relatives!” 
(Central Asia – Caucasus Analyst, February 20, 2004) might have been a good 
example. 
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Appendix 1: Comparison of Theoretical 
Approaches and Empirical Results 
Theoretical approaches Application 
√ Theory matches 
X Theory does not match 
— No statement possible 
Conclusion 
1. Framework 
Wages — - lower than subsistence 
minimum 
- no statement about 
impact of an increase 
 
Personal characteristics 
- Education 
- Gender 
- Reference group 
 
— 
— 
— 
X 
 
- no significant 
statements 
 
Country characteristics 
- Police 
- Oligarchy 
- Homogenous society 
- Centralization 
-Interrupted democ  
  racy/ war 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
— 
√ 
 
- conditions favorable for 
corruption exist 
2. Formal institutions 
Transparency and 
lucidity of legislation 
X - procedures and 
regulations reasonably 
transparent 
 
PAC relationships 
- “Joint monopoly” 
- “Stationary bandit” 
- Corruption “without 
theft” 
 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
- Admission Committee 
acts as “joint monopoly” 
and “stationary bandit” 
 
Control and penalty 
 
√ 
 
- no adequate control 
body, no punishment 
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3. Informal institutions 
 
Legal culture 
 
√ 
 
- favors family ties, not 
office duties 
 
Religion 
 
√ 
 
- Orthodox Christianity 
emphasizes family ties, 
not individual 
„Administrative market” √ - developed during 
Soviet period 
 
Blat’ 
 
√ 
 
- determines daily life 
 
Gewaltunternehmen 
 
X 
 
- not known in the 
context of the Georgian 
higher education system 
 
 
Source: Results from the empirical findings 
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Appendix 2: List of people with whom interviews 
were conducted from August to October 2004 
 Organization 
1. American University’s Transnational Crime and Corruption Center 
(TraCCC), Senior researcher, now: Director 
2. Central and Eastern European Bankwatch Network, Regional Coordinator 
Caucasus 
3. Chamber of Control , Deputy Head of the Department Social Sector 
4. Chamber of Control, Assistant R. Bokeria 
5. Chamber of Control, Controller 
6. Chamber of Control, Translator 
7. Director, Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD) 
8. Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, Deputy Chairwoman 
9. Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, Lawyer 
10. Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, Lawyer, previous TSU student 
11. GTU, Undergraduate student 
12. Institute of East European Studies of the Freie Universität, Researcher 
13. Journalist, parent 
14. Kmara! (English : Enough), student resistance movement, set up in 2003  
15. Liberty Institute 
16. Ministry of Education, First Deputy 
17. Pedagogical University, students 
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18. Transparency International Georgia Chair 
19. Transparency International Georgia, Chair 
20. TSU, 1st year Political Science students 
21. TSU, 5th year Political Science student 
22. TSU, 5th year Political Science student 
23. TSU, Art students 
24. TSU, Graduate student Political Science 
25. TSU, International Law student 
26. TSU, Lecturer Biology 
27. TSU, Lecturer German Philology 
28. TSU, Philology student 
29. TSU, Physics students 
30. TSU, Political Science and History students 
31. TSU, Political Science student 
32. TSU, Political Science students 
33. TSU, Public Relations students 
34. Parent of a TSU student 
 
 
